Chase Home Fin., LLC v Minott, 2014 NY Slip Op 01427, Decided on March 5, 2014, Appellate Division, Second Department (emphasis supplied):
"The plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action in December 2007 against
Karon A. Minott, among others. Minott does not dispute that she was served with
process and received the summons and complaint in late 2007 or early 2008. The
plaintiff also served Minott with an order of reference in 2009. Nevertheless,
Minott did not interpose an answer or otherwise appear in the action for more
than four years after she was served with the summons and complaint. By order to
show cause dated July 5, 2012, Minott moved for leave to interpose a late answer
and, in effect, to vacate her default in appearing or answering. The Supreme
Court granted the motion, concluding that Minott "ha[d] set forth a reasonable
excuse and a potentially meritorious defense to the action." A defendant seeking
to vacate a default in answering a complaint and to compel the plaintiff to
accept an untimely answer as timely must show both a reasonable excuse for the
default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Community Preserv. Corp. v
Bridgewater Condominiums, LLC, 89 AD3d 784; Taddeo-Amendola v 970 Assets,
LLC, 72 AD3d 677; Perfect Care, Inc. v Ultracare Supplies, Inc., 71 AD3d
752, 753).
Here, Minott's claims that she "did not know that [she] needed to submit an
answer," and that she relied on the advice of her real estate broker instead of
consulting an attorney, do not constitute a reasonable excuse for her default
(see U.S. Bank N.A. v
Slavinski, 78 AD3d 1167, 1168; Yao Ping Tang v Grand Estate, LLC, 77 AD3d 822, 823; Dorrer v Berry, 37 AD3d
519, 520). This is especially so in view of the fact that the summons which
was served upon Minott contained the specific language mandated by RPAPL 1320
warning her that she should "[s]peak to an attorney or go to the court," and
that she "must respond by serving a copy of the answer" or risk the loss of her
[*2]home (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Lafazan,
AD3d [decided herewith]). Moreover, although Minott alleges that she responded
to the court notices to attend foreclosure settlement conferences in 2012, this
does not excuse her preceding multi-year failure to answer the complaint. In
addition, she has not demonstrated that the invocation of a court's inherent
power to vacate a judgment in the interest of substantial justice is warranted
in this case (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62; Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d
888). "
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