Wednesday, June 30, 2021

COVID, CO-OPS...AND MASKS


Rush Props. v. Riveros, Date filed: 2021-06-15, Court: Supreme Court, Nassau, Judge: Justice Thomas Rademaker, Case Number: 601909/2021:

"DECISION/ORDER The Plaintiff moves by Order to Show Cause for an Order of the Court which seeks, inter alia, to enjoin Defendant Dawn Riveros, her agents, servants, tenant(s), guests and any other occupants of the premises located at 157 Hempstead Avenue, Apartment 12C, Lynbrook, NY 11.563 (“the Premises”) from entering and/or utilizing common areas of the Cooperative (hereinafter “Co-op”) Building without wearing a face covering/mask; 2) compel Defendant Riveros to wear a face covering/mask whenever in the Go-Op building’s common areas, and 3) award the Plaintiff attorney’s fees, costs, and disbursements incurred in connection with its application. The Respondent did not file opposition to this Order to Show Cause. The Plaintiff, Rush Properties LLC, is a New York limited liability company, and at all times mentioned, was both a shareholder/tenant of a certain cooperative apartment located at 157 Hempstead Avenue, Apt. 12C, Lynbrook, New York. The Plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement with the Defendant for a one-year term, beginning October 1, 2018, and ending on September 30, 2019. This lease was extended by a one-year term beginning October 1, 2019, and ending September 30, 2020, by a written agreement dated July 25, 2019. The lease requires the Defendant to comply with “all laws, orders, rules, requests, and directions, of all governmental authorities” and that the “comfort or rights of other [t]enants must not be interfered with.” The lease also provides that the tenant understands that she is renting an apartment in a Co-op building, and that the lease is subject to the Co-op Offering Plan and Amendments, Proprietary Lease, House Rules, and any other governing Co-op documents.

The Plaintiff contends that on numerous occasions the Defendant entered common areas of the Cooperative apartment building without wearing a face mask or facial covering and that such behavior was in derogation of the regulations promulgated by the state of New York to combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus. The Plaintiff further contends that such behavior resulted from complaints by other tenants in the Co-op apartment and that by refusing to wear a face mask or facial covering the Defendant has placed the health and safety of other residents at risk, and therefore is in violation of the express and implied terms of her tenancy.

On or about February 17, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a summons and complaint against the Defendant in which the Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, a mandatory injunction directing and compelling the Defendant to wear a face covering/mask whenever in the Co-Op building’s common areas; judgment that the Defendant has violated her lease; costs, expenses, disbursements and attorney’s fees incurred in connection with asserting this action; a money in an amount to be determined at trial, but believed to be in excess of $40,000; and an Order ejecting Defendant from the Premises and immediately restoring Plaintiff to possession of the Premises and awarding the Plaintiff damages.

In moving for injunctive relief by Order to Show Cause, the Plaintiff contends that it is essentially acting in response to complaints from the cooperative board and other residents and seeks to take corrective action against its tenant.

A cooperative or condominium association is quasi-governmental and can be considered a democratic sub-society of necessity. (Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 75 NY2d 530, 533 [1990]). The proprietary lessees or condominium owners consent to be governed, in certain aspects, by the decisions of a board. Like a municipal government, such governing boards are responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the cooperative and to that end, often have broad powers in areas that range from financial decision making to promulgating regulations regarding pets and parking spaces. Authority to approve or disapprove structural alterations is commonly given to the governing board. (Id.)

Even when the governing board acts within the scope of its authority, some check on its potential powers to regulate residents’ conduct, life-style, and property rights is necessary to protect individual residents from abusive exercise, notwithstanding that the residents have, to an extent, consented to be regulated and even selected their representatives. These goals are best served by a standard of review that is analogous to the business judgment rule applied by courts to determine challenges to decisions made by corporate directors (Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 75 NY2d 530, 533 [1990]).

A governing board owes its duty of loyalty to its cooperative — that is, it must act for the benefit of the residents collectively. So long as the board acts for the purposes of the cooperative, within the scope of its authority and in good faith, courts will not substitute their judgment for the board. Stated somewhat differently, unless a resident challenging the board’s action is able to demonstrate a breach of this duty, judicial review is not available. (Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 75 NY2d 530, 533 [1990]). The very concept of cooperative living entails a voluntary, shared control over rules, maintenance, and the composition of the community. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals observed in Levandusky, a shareholder-tenant voluntarily agrees to submit to the authority of a cooperative board, and consequently the board “may significantly restrict the bundle of rights a property owner normally enjoys.” (Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 536).

However, when dealing with termination, courts must exercise a heightened vigilance in examining whether the board’s action meets the Levandusky test. (40 W, 67th St. Corp. v. Pullman, 100 NY2d 147, 158 [2003]). “While deferential, the Levandusky standard should not serve as a rubber stamp for cooperative board actions, particularly those involving tenancy terminations.” (Id. at 157.) The Pullman Court found that in the case before it, “the cooperative unfailingly followed the procedures contained in the lease when acting to terminate defendant’s tenancy.” (Id. at 156.) In particular, the Pullman Court noted that the Board had called a special meeting and given the defendant an opportunity to be heard; acted by super majority vote; properly fashioned the issue and the question to be addressed by resolution; and enacted a resolution which “specified the basis for the action, setting forth a list of specific findings as to defendant’s objectionable behavior.” (320 Owners Corp. v. Harvey, 2008 NY Slip Op 32796[U], *4-5 [Sup Ct, NY County 2008])

On March 7, 2020, the Governor of the State of New York issued Executive Order Number 202 (hereinafter “Executive Order 202″) which declared a State disaster emergency and exercised disaster emergency powers necessary to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic and public health crises. Subsequently, Executive Order 202 was followed by Executive Order 202.17, which required “any individual over the age of two and able to medically tolerate a face-covering” was to be “required to cover their nose and mouth with a mask or cloth face-covering when in a public place and unable to maintain…social distance.” (N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.17 [Effective Date April 17, 2020]).

With respect to COVID-19 response, Co-op boards are and have been confronted by significant considerations when implementing, applying, and enforcing social distancing guidelines within their communities, particularly in common areas. Some Co-op boards “have moved to require a face covering in all common areas in their buildings.” Thus, if an individual fails to wear a face mask, that would “be a violation of the law, and therefore, a breach of the proprietary lease.” The one exception to this is if “the individual cannot medically tolerate a face covering.” (Phyllis Weisberg, Q&A: Cover Your Face or Face a Fine, Cooperator New York (July 2020], available at https//cooperatornews.com/article/qa-cover-your-face-or-face-a-fine [Last accessed June 15, 2021]).

Under recent New York State guidelines, a Co-op board may be presented with two choices. First, the board can “continue with the Board’s current COVID-19 policy.” Second, a board can “adopt a new COVID-19 policy following the May 13, 2021 CDC Recommendations.” (Considerations for Co-Ops and Condos in Light of New CDC Recommendations, Armstrong Teasdale [May 21, 2021 available at https://www.armstrongteasdale.com/thought-leadership/considerations-for-co-ops-and-condos-in-light-of-new-cdc-recommendations.'last accessed June 15, 2021]).

Under the first option, the Co-op board can “continue to utilize the current system it has established for social distancing and masks for residents, staff contractors, and visitors, without regard to their vaccination status.” (Id.) This is the more conservative approach and can be “changed at any time in the future.” (Id.) Under the second option, a Co-op board can adopt the May 13, 2020 CDC Rules, which permit “fully vaccinated people” to forgo masks and social distancing requirements, but requires unvaccinated people to continue to wear facial coverings and practice social distancing. (Id.)

The instant action was filed prior to the widespread availability of vaccines to the general population. COVID-19 response involves an ever evolving Federal and New York regulatory environment, which becomes less restrictive as more individuals become vaccinated. (See Emma Kinery, “Cuomo Lifts N.Y. Covid Mandates After Reaching 70 percent Vaccine Goal,” Bloomberg June 15, 2021[http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-15/cuomo-lifts-n-v-covid-mandates-after-reaching-70-vaccine-goal])

On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, and a balancing of equities in favor of granting the injunction. (Nobu Next Door, LLC v. Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839 [2005]; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 NY2d 860 [1990]). If any one of these three requirements are not satisfied, the motion must be denied. (Faberge Intern., Inc. v. Di Pino, 109 AD2d 235 [1st Dept. 1985]). An injunction is a provisional remedy to maintain the status quo and prevent the dissipation of property that could render a judgment ineffectual. However, it is not to determine the ultimate rights of the parties. As such, absent extraordinary circumstances, a preliminary injunction will not issue where to do so would grant the movant the ultimate relief sought in the complaint. (Reichman v. Reichman, 88 AD3d 680 [2nd Dept. 2011]); (SHS Baisley, LLC v. Res Land, Inc., 18 AD3d 727 [2nd Dept. 2005]). In addition, preliminary injunctions should not be granted absent extraordinary or unique circumstances or where the final judgment may otherwise fail to afford complete relief. (Matter of Lasertron Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 70 Misc 3d 1085, 1092 [Sup Ct, Erie County 2021])

The movants herein request that the Court exercise its equitable powers and compel the Defendant to wear a mask or facial covering. It is a familiar principle that a court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the action, will adapt its relief to the exigencies of the case. (Valentine v. Richardt, 126 NY 272 [1891]), and that an equitable award may be available to “prevent a failure of justice.” (Barker v. Sabato, 251 AD 834 [2nd Dept 1937]). Ultimately, however, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the Court. (Matter of Buffalo Teachers Fedn. Inc v. Board of Educ. of the City School District of the City of Buffalo, 71 Misc3d 289 [Sup Ct. Erie County 2021]).

COVID-19 social distancing and face covering requirements constitutes an ever evolving regulatory scheme, and other than several emails complaints from other tenants, which must be considered hearsay by the Court, the Plaintiff has not presented evidence in admissible form that the Defendant’s conduct has risen to a level of a threat to public health. Furthermore, granting an order which requires the tenant to wear a facial covering fails to take into consideration any potential regulatory changes to COVID-19, and raises the potential that a tenant could remain under continuous order to remain masked, even despite being medically unable to tolerate same, as well as cause that tenant to be subject to limitless future applications for contempt.

Upon a careful review of the affidavit in support of the Plaintiff s motions, and the annexed exhibits thereto, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court finds the Plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proof necessary to warrant injunctive relief. As a result, the Plaintiff s motion is hereby DENIED in its entirety."


Tuesday, June 29, 2021

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF MINOR


To many, parenting seems like it never ends but legally, certain parental responsibilities do.

For example, under General Obligations Law 3-112,  parents and legal guardians are responsible for the actions of their minor children which, under this statute, applies if a minor child is over 10, and less than 18, years old. Here are some cases:

In Peerless Insurance Co. v. Prim, 2007 NY Slip Op 32178 - NY: Supreme Court 2007, the mother of a 14 year old girl was responsible for damages caused when her daughter drove through the parking lot of the Mattituck Plaza, lost control, accelerated, and then drove through an ice-cream shop. 

In Rivera v. Meehan, 2012 NY Slip Op 51652 - NY: Appellate Term, 2nd Dept. 2012, the parents of a 17 year old boy were responsible for landscaping damages to their neighbor's property caused by their son's ATV.

Monday, June 28, 2021

ACCESS TO LOCAL LAWS, REGULATIONS & CODES - NASSAU COUNTY


Before the internet digital world existed, it could be an exhausting day of research to ascertain various provisions of a county's local laws and rules, etc.

But today, it is just a click away. Here is one example of local government working diligently to have these resources available to the entire community:

Nassau County Laws, Regulations & Codes

Friday, June 25, 2021

CHILD CUSTODY - THE EFFECT OF INCOME DISPARITY AND CHILD PREFERENCES


And note the last paragraph and footnote...IMHO, this is a well written decision, demonstrating the empathy which is a hallmark of Judge Sunshine.

VL v. DL, 2021 NY Slip Op 50502 - King Co. Supreme Court May 19, 2021:

"JEFFREY S. SUNSHINE, J.

This Court must determine if modification of a parenting agreement where parties enjoy joint custody is warranted based upon the clear desires of two teenage children where without a doubt the Defendant's economically superior ability has impacted the children.

The request is bolstered by the remarriage of the Defendant, the change in the Defendant's employment making him and his work from home spouse is more available for the children's needs and desires. The Defendant, supported by the children, is seeking to have residential parenting time changed to two weeks in a row with the Defendant and one week with the Plaintiff.

This dynamic presents the Plaintiff with a predicament. She must work full time to support herself and care for the children, and she does not have the resources of the Defendant and his new spouse to compete with meeting the children's economic and other desires. She cannot provide the children with the luxuries or the time that that other parent. She clearly operated under the assumption that good joint custodial parenting is allowing the other parent to step up to the plate to fill that void, only to find herself facing a calendar and diary allegedly documenting the greater period of time the children have been voluntarily spending with the father. Nor can this Court allow to go unnoticed that the request for a change in custody only comes before the court after the Plaintiff twice seeks enforcement of substantial child support due and owing in the form of a cross motion.

The Court cannot determine based upon the testimony adduced at trial if the Defendant did not pay the child support because he erroneously believed he should not have to because the children were spending more time with him. As opposed to the Plaintiff having not regularly sought the monies that she would waive same. The Plaintiff puts forth the argument that her return to the full time work force and the need to support her and the children' needs is the basis for the claim that Defendant should have more time with the children than the Plaintiff.

The matter was tried before this Court in a hearing conducted virtually due to the present pandemic emergency. On the record on July 2, 2019 this Court denied the Defendant Father's request for sole custody in as much as the parties continued for the most part to cooperate and act in the best interest of their children. The Court did though set the matter down for a hearing on the issues of parenting time given the specific requests of the Attorney for the Child. The Attorney for the Child asserted his clients were in support of the Father's application for expanded parenting time beyond the agreed upon parenting schedule.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in April 2003 and the parties have two children D.L. and E.L. Plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in 2011. The parties executed a Stipulation of Settlement in April 2012. According to the Stipulation of Settlement the parties shared joint legal custody and Plaintiff had residential custody. The parties' parenting time schedule was three-and-a-half days each. At the time of the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement, D.L. was eight years old and E.L. was five years old. At the present time, D.L. is seventeen years old and E.L. is thirteen years old.

Plaintiff's counsel called the Plaintiff as a witness to testify during Plaintiff's case on October 30, 2020 and November 18, 2020. Defendant's counsel called the Defendant and Defendant's wife (A.L.) as witnesses to testify during Defendant's case. Defendant testified on August 5, 2020 and September 22, 2020 and Defendant's Wife testified on September 24, 2020. The Attorney for the children did not call any witnesses. There were in camera interviews held with the children separately, virtually due to the pandemic emergency at an agreed upon location.

The Contentions

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant's request for a change of parenting time is wrongfully predicated upon a theory that she is not an adequate caretaker for the children and that he has more resources than she does to care for the children. Plaintiff argues and in fact the Defendant did at trial offer testimony regarding, the size of his residence, that his family members live nearby, that the Plaintiff lives nearby, that he is the primary caretaker to the children in regards to doctors and schooling and that the Plaintiff is not involved in the children's lives to the extent he and his wife are.

Plaintiff testified that from the time D.L. was born in 2004, she was a homemaker. After her separation from the Defendant in about 2012, she began a part time job during school hours. In 2015, after being essentially out of the workforce for more than 10 years, she began working full time. At that point, she needed childcare assistance part of the week. Since cheerleading was an activity the children had immediately after school. The Defendant and his family assisted in cheerleading activities. Plaintiff was able to pick the children up after work once her work schedule changed in 2018. Until then, Defendant's enrollment of the children in cheerleading, with her knowledge he coordinated transportation from the activity and Plaintiff welcomed the help without questioning Defendant's motive. She had no objection to either Defendant or someone [Family Members] at his direction picking up the children at 4:00 p.m. from cheerleading and bring them either to her home or his home. On September 15, 2018, Plaintiff started a new job where she had flexibility in her work hours. She thereafter was able to pick up the children on her days from cheerleading. Defendant asserts this was only because she was concerned about Plaintiffs seeking a change in custody.

The Plaintiff steadfastly maintains that she was the primary caretaker of the children from birth and that she was the one who provided the care of them prior to and after the divorce. The Defendant had previously worked in the restaurant pizza business at that time and even after the divorce she continued to be the primary caretaker. It also appeared to the Court that she exercised appropriate judgment and was credible in her assertion that she and the Defendant for the most part had an amenable relationship post-divorce when it came to the children. She lives in a smaller home, and her mother lives with her and the two children. When she initially returned to work full time, she was not able to transport the children to and from extracurricular activities and she welcomed the assistance.

Plaintiff denies that she in any way interfered with the Defendant's ability to have contact with the school as alleged by Defendant and asserted she allowed the children to visit with and stay with the Defendant while she was working. She vehemently denies that the children are not properly taken care of when with her.

The Plaintiff does assert that she cannot compete economically with the Defendant and his present spouse. The Defendant's new spouse works from home, that they have a pool which was very helpful for the children this past summer due to Covid travel restrictions, that she does not have as much room as they do in her home and that she does not have the funds to take the children on a family trip to Hawaii or Cape May, New Jersey like the Defendant did.

There was much testimony about the Defendant wanting to infringe on the Plaintiff's parenting time with the children and take the children to Cape May during her time this past summer and her refusal. The event was complicated by the Defendant unfortunately utilizing one or both children as a messenger in an attempt to convince the Plaintiff to allow them to visit.

As to an incident involving one of the children needing to be picked up from school due to a personal issue, Defendant asserts Plaintiff was not the parent who accomplished this but it was Defendant's present wife who was able to do so. Defendant posits that this is just one more instance why he and his present wife are more able to mee the children's needs. Plaintiff counters that the Defendant's wife works from home and the Plaintiff was at work that day and that both parties agreed that Defendant's wife is normally on the "blue card" and Plaintiff was not trying exclude her and was fine with her picking up the child. There was testimony regarding access or lack of access to the emergency contact card also known as a "blue card".

Plaintiff argues that the Defendant had an issue with E.L. getting a 30 on a test of the map of Italy when Plaintiff studied with her because the Defendant stated that she gets much better grades when studying with him but neglected to state that the entire class retook the test. Plaintiff further argues that it was not her fault for the child failing as the Defendant claims and the claims by the Defendant that the children getting higher grades in his care and he deserves more parenting time is insignificant.

Plaintiff stated that Defendant claims that the grades of the child dropped after the schedule reverted to a strict 50/50 time sharing post pandemic, with the implication being that the children being with the Plaintiff more caused their grades to suffer and that if the Defendant was really involved the Defendant would have noticed a drop in grades prior the end of the marking period.

Plaintiff testified that she was unable to take the children to medical appointments as Defendant claims because the Defendant withheld the insurance cards and by the time, he provided them he had changed the children's pediatrician. Defendant counters that the Plaintiff did not object as she trusted his opinion on the matter even though he deliberately held on to the insurance cards until after the switch of the doctors was made.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant claims that the parties switched the doctor together and that in the past he had made all the doctors' appointments and that prior to the cross motion the Plaintiff never appeared for any doctor's appointments is in error as the Plaintiff stayed home from the time the children were born and took them to all doctor's appointments prior to 2015.

Plaintiff posits that any change in grades is insignificant as that she is involved in the children's schooling as she made the choice to have the children go to school remotely during the pandemic instead of blended learning and she was able to structure the school days for the children during the remote learning. Plaintiff testified that she is also involved with the children's teachers and that she did not need to go to the student teacher conferences since the children were doing well and spoke to a teacher via telephone or by other means.

The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's claims that the children do not shower at her house and are disheveled is not accurate as at times the children come from Defendant's house disheveled. The Plaintiff further argues that the children are 13 and 17 and they can take a shower whenever they want as the Plaintiff also purchases hygiene products for the children and the children's hair.

The Plaintiff testified that she has done the best under the circumstances. It is undisputed and that she refuses to speak with Defendant's new wife and denies allegations that she did not invite him and his family to the daughters sweet 16. She asserts that she is involved in the children's lives and monitors their schoolwork. Defendant apparently discounts Plaintiff's claims of economic need because she paid for an expensive sweet 16 for the older daughter.

Plaintiff testified with pride about her children and how she enjoyed spending time with them and provided insight into how they were two different children but certainly was proud of them.

Her testimony was credible that she wants the children to have a relationship with their father and that he has been of help when covering some of the extracurricular activity transportation because of her work schedule and she readily admits she does not speak with the Defendant's present spouse. She asserts that it is that same need to work and earn money which has prevented her from attending after school events and was the basis to welcome the Defendant's offers of transportation and attendance at events.

She denies that she has not been involved in the children's health care and has made as many appointments as possible.

Defendant testified that he has been employed in a union job for about 4 years and he is a "heat-controlled" mechanic. Defendant further testified that his base salary is $29.96 per hour which he asserts comes out to about $60,000.00 to $65,000.00 per year and that he earned $83,000.00 with overtime in the 2019 year.

Defendant testified that he is the primary caregiver of the children and is the parent who takes the children to their doctors' appointments, assists them with their schooling and meets all their other needs. Defendant elaborated regarding his caretaking of both children from when the parties divorced up and until the present. The Defendant further testified that he researched his daughter's doctors and that he was the one who helped with homework, projects, PTA, appointments, and extracurricular activities. He asserts that when the Plaintiff did make an eye doctor appointment for one of the children he was not notified, and he was the one who arranged for medical care when there was a need and sought alternatives to surgery.

Defendant testified that he attended all the children's parent teacher conferences and that the Plaintiff did not attend a single parent teacher conference until after his filing of the cross motion in 2018 and still she only attended one conference for one of the children. Defendant also testified that Plaintiff only started to pick up E.L. from cheerleading after the filing of the Cross Motion. Defendant's wife testified that the Plaintiff attended one out of at least 16 cheerleading competitions over a four-year period but only after the Cross Motion was filed.

The Defendant posits that there was a change in circumstance in October 2015 that caused the parenting time schedule to change from the Defendant having the children three-and-a-half days per week overnight to four to five overnights per week. The Defendant further testified that the schedule changed because D.L. wanted to join cheerleading and carpooling did not work out so Defendant picked up both children from school and brought them to his home and the children began sleeping at his home 5 night's per week.

Defendant testified that in 2015 he had the children between four to five overnights and the Plaintiff voiced no objections to the schedule after the change occurred and the Plaintiff did not take any steps to enforce that parties' Stipulation of Settlement. Defendant testified at trial and displayed a calendar to allegedly show the change in the parenting time schedule, which Plaintiff asserted was not totally accurate.

Defendant testified that the schedule reverted back to the three-and-a-half-day schedule in the Stipulation of Settlement after the current proceeding began and that after the change in parenting time schedule D.L.'s grades started to decrease in English, Algebra and Physical Education when she was spending more time in the Plaintiff's home.

It is conceded that during COVID-19 pandemic the parties again amicably changed the parenting time schedule so that the children would spend one week at each parent's home to avoid too much transportation between the homes. That when the children are with him during his week the children sit around the dinner table with him and his present wife to do homework. This is the schedule presently in effect.

Defendant believes that he is the parent who provides the superior home environment as the children each have their own bed, a desk, a couch bathroom, and there is a spare room where the children do their homework. Defendant went through great lengths to describe his large home and that the first floor has a kitchen, dining room, living room and den area and also described the backyard area which has a pool, with a wraparound porch and vegetable and fruit patch. The Defendant described the basement to show that the children have room to grow. In addition to having family members near his home, when he works some overnights at his job, the children are home with his present Wife. Defendant's present Wife testified that she makes sure the children do their homework, prepare for the next day and do house chores and that she bakes with them.

Both the Defendant and his present wife assert that when the children come to their home after being with their mother, they appear disheveled and that they do not have adequate toiletries at the Plaintiff's house. The Defendant's wife claims the children rush to the shower and appear not to shower when with the Plaintiff. The Defendant also asserts that he is more understanding of the needs of the children and that they identify more with him. The Defendant also asserted that the Plaintiff interfered with his ability to deal with the school because he was not on the "blue card". He placed great emphasis on the fact that he had greater insight into the children.

In summation (which is not evidence) the Attorney for the child argues that the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the Children love both parents equally, but enjoy spending time with their Father more than with their Mother and given their ages and levels of maturity, the children's feelings should be given great weight, and the Court should grant their request to spend more time with the Father.

The Attorney for the Child argues on behalf of his clients that the two-week/one week schedule would allow the children to remain with the Defendant more than the Plaintiff without deteriorating the relationship and bond with the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff works during the week and will have the children every other weekend on days she does not work.

The Attorney for the Child argued that the change in overnight schedule continued for multiple years with the Defendant keeping records as to how many overnights were had per parent and the father having a substantial amount more time. He further argued that the Plaintiff did not make any objections for years as to the new arrangement as the Plaintiff understandably had conflicts with her work schedule. The Attorney for the Child asserts that the Defendant's schedule is more flexible giving him more time with the children while the Plaintiff's schedule is stricter, and the Plaintiff made no effort to confront this point.

It is for these reasons the Attorney for the Child supports that the Defendant to be the primary caretaker of the children and even though the parties agreed to the Plaintiff being the primary caretaker originally and assumed the role originally of primary caretaker.

Counsel asserts that it is this change of circumstance that justifies the Court to set aside the original order. The Attorney for the Child argues that the modification that it is not only in the best interests of the children but is what works for this family and what the children want and supports the two weeks with Defendant schedule and one with the Plaintiff.

Defendant requests this Court award him residential custody of the children and the following parental access schedule: Two weeks from Monday through Friday with Defendant; One week from Monday through Friday with Plaintiff; and Alternating weekends.

Defendant requests the following holiday schedule: Christmas Eve overnight to Christmas Day every year; Alternate New Year holiday with Plaintiff; Palm Sunday and Easter Sunday every year; Winter and Spring break every year; and 4th of July every year.

The Attorney for the Child requests that Court issues the following: Modifying the Stipulation of Settlement to make the Father the residential custodial parent; Modifying the stipulation of settlement to change parenting time to the two week/one-week rotation in the favor of the Father; Since the Stipulation of Settlement does not specify holiday visitation time, the Court should modify the Stipulation in the following respects:

(a) Alternate the New Year's Eve/New Year's Day Holiday between the parties every year.
(b) Award the Father parenting time for winter and spring break every year.
(c) Award the Father Palm Sunday and Easter Sunday every year.
(d) Award the Father July 4th every year; and
(e) Award the Father Christmas Eve through Christmas morning every year.

Plaintiff is asking the Court to order that she have a two-week vacation over the summer.

It appears that the Plaintiff requests the Court entertain a holiday vacation schedule.

Conclusion

The Court in Matter of Connell-Charleus v Charleus, 140 N.Y.S.3d 752, 2021 NY [2nd Dept 2021] ruled that:

"A party seeking modification of an existing custody arrangement must show the existence of such a change in circumstances that modification is required to ensure the continued best interests of the child (Matter of Sidorowicz v Sidorowicz, 101 AD3d 737, 738; see Matter of Fargasch v Alves, 116 AD3d 774). While joint custody is encouraged as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion (Braiman v Braiman, 44 NY2d 584, 589-590), joint custody is inappropriate where parents have evidenced an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child (see Matter of Schweizer v Jablesnik, 95 AD3d 1341; Matter of Edwards v Rothschild, 60 AD3d 675, 677). "A change from joint legal custody to sole custody by one parent is warranted where `the parties' relationship is so acrimonious that it effectively precludes joint decision-making'" (Matter of Schweizer v Jablesnik, 95 AD3d at 1342, quoting Matter of Picado v Doan, 90 AD3d 932, 933). Moreover, inasmuch as a court's custody determination is dependent in large part upon its assessment of the witnesses' credibility and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, the court's exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed if supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Shisgal v Abels, 179 AD3d 1070; Matter of Ruiz v Carie, 179 AD3d 1069; Matter of Pritchard v Coelho, 177 AD3d 887)"

There has been a change of circumstances the question is do they rise to the level of an unforeseen or unanticipated change. In the matter of Walter v Walter, 178 AD3d 991, 992 [2d Dept 2019], the Second Department stated: Modification of a court-approved stipulation setting forth terms of custody or [parental access] is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that a modification is necessary to ensure the best interests and welfare of the child. (Greenberg v Greenberg, 144 AD3d 625, 629, 41 N.Y.S.3d 49; see Hughes v Hughes, 131 AD3d 1207, 1208, 16 N.Y.S.3d 861; Anonymous 2011-1 v Anonymous 2011-2, 102 AD3d 640, 641, 958 N.Y.S.2d 181). The best interests of the child are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658; Goldstein v Goldstein, 68 AD3d 717, 720, 889 N.Y.S.2d 661).

"Where parents enter into an agreement concerning custody, `it will not be set aside unless there is a sufficient change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation and unless the modification of the custody agreement is in the best interests of the [child].'" McNally v. McNally, 28 AD3d 526, 816 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2nd Dept. 2006), quoting Smoczkiewicz v. Smoczkiewicz, 2 AD3d 705, 706, 770 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2nd Dept. 2003). "Although the totality of the circumstances of the case and the best interests of the child are factors to be considered in all cases where modification of custody is sought where the parties have entered into an agreement, the agreement is entitled to considerable weight and it is incumbent on the party seeking the change to show that in light of changed circumstances continued adherence to the agreement would not be in the children's best interests." Steck v. Steck, 307 AD2d 819, 763 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dept. 2003).

Courts have carved out factors which must be considered in ascertaining whether a change in an existing custodial arrangement is in the best interests of children, including (1) the individual needs and expressed desires of the children; (2) the need of the children to live with siblings; (3) the continuity and stability of the existing custodial arrangement, including the relative fitness of the parents and the length of time the present custodial agreement has continued; (4) the quality of the children's home environment and that of the parent seeking custody; (5) the ability of each parent to provide for the children's emotional and intellectual development; and (6) the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the children (Fox v Fox, 177 AD2d 209, 210, 582 NYS2d 863 [4th Dept 1992]; see also Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 172-173, 436 NE2d 1260, 451 NYS2d 658 [1982]).

The change in circumstances in the case at bar are that the Defendant no longer works very long hours in the Pizzeria business and he has a union job, his work hours have changed and he is able to spend more time in the afternoons and evenings during certain days of the week with the children. He has remarried and his new spouse has developed a close bond with the children while recognizing that she is not their mother but has ample time devote to the children. That the children have adapted to and appreciate the resources their father can provide including a large home, pool, resources for vacations and the clear desires of the children to spend more time with the Defendant than the Plaintiff. The Defendant has been actively involved in the children's daily needs including but not limited to school and medical needs.

It is well established in New York that the Court must consider the desires of the children. They obviously were young when the agreement was signed. Children's preference are one factor to consider in determining where custody should lie and although a child's preference, in itself, is not a material change of circumstance sufficient to justify a change in custody from one parent to another (see Fox v Fox, 177 AD2d 209 [1992],), the older and more mature the child, the greater weight will be accorded to the child's preference (Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 [1982],). It has been held in this Judicial Department "Substantively, and more importantly, it cannot be denied that a teenage child has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of litigation between the parents as to where the child should live and who should be entrusted to make decisions for the child. It seems self-evident that the child is the person most affected by a judicial determination on the fundamental issues of responsibility for, and the environment of, the child's upbringing." Newton v McFarlane, 174 AD3d 67 (2nd Dept. 2019). The Court in Newton, found that the Family Court erred in "failing to give due consideration to the expressed preferences of the child, who was 14 and 15 years old at the time of the proceedings in the Family Court, and who communicated a clear desire to remain in the father's custody."

Additionally, this Court must also consider the applicable precedent in this State which disfavors separation of siblings. The Court in Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658 [1982] stated that:

"this court has long recognized that it is often in the child's best interests to continue to live with his siblings. While this, too, is not an absolute, the stability and companionship to be gained from keeping the children together is an important factor for the court to consider. Close familial relationships are much to be encouraged. (Ebert v. Ebert, 38 NY2d 700, 346 N.E.2d 240, 382 N.Y.S.2d 472 [1976] Young brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences, and to separate them, unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful. (Obey v. Degling, 37 NY2d 768, 337 N.E.2d 601, 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 [1975])"

Here the older child is 17 and turns 18 this year. Once she reaches the age of 18 the Court is divested of jurisdiction on the issue of custody and the residence of the child. (see Slater-Mau v Mau, 4 AD3d 658, 772 NYS2d 134 [2004]; Matter of Lazaro v Lazaro, 227 AD2d 402, 642 NYS2d 67 [1996])" See: Gugliara v Veras, 170 AD3d 815, 93 N.Y.S.3d 883 [2nd Dept 2019]

It is clear to this Court that these children should not and must not be separated. With the older child clearly desiring to live with the Defendant two weeks in a row and having the ability to do so absent court order shortly would leave the younger daughter without the benefit of being with her older sibling a substantial amount of time. The younger daughter also desires that residential custody be on a two-week Defendant and one-week Plaintiff parenting time.

There is no doubt that the Defendant loves his children and wants for them the best care and resources possible. He clearly understands them and has a devotion to them. It is also admirable of the amount of support and assistance his present wife provides to the children. Similarly, there is absolutely no doubt that the Plaintiff loves and cares for these children and the children love her. In fact, she has been more willing to sacrifice her standing as a joint residential parent to meet their needs.

Under existing case law and especially in light of Newton (Supra) the desires of the children together with the clear increase in the Defendant's parenting role and the time the children spend with him the change is warranted. Thus, the court grants the Defendant's application for residential custody and the schedule for the children to be with him is modified to two weeks from Monday through Friday with Defendant; One week from Monday through Friday with Plaintiff; and Alternating weekends.

The Court believes that there is no basis to modify the party's agreement of joint legal custody. For the most part they both have taken active rolls in the children's lives and are able to communicate with each other. Although the relationship between the both parents in this case is not perfect, the relationship does not rise to the level that it is so acrimonious that joint decision-making is not possible. The parties agreed to joint legal custody and there is no basis to change that at this time.

There is a basis though to change residential custody from the Plaintiff to the Defendant, based upon the clear and unequivocal request from the children.

What is of concern to the Court is what appears to be an economic disparity between parties influencing the ability of one parent to provide far more resources to meet the needs and desires of teenage children while the other party has had to seek enforcement of child support obligations while working full time.

All parties and the Attorney for the Children appear desirous of the court scheduling a firm parenting holiday schedule. The Court orders:

(a) Alternate New Year's Eve until New Year's Day morning 10 A.M. between the parties every year with odd years to the Plaintiff and even years to the Defendant.
(b) Alternate New Year's Day between the parties every year with odd years to the Defendant and even years to the Plaintiff.
(c) Alternate the winter and spring break between the parties every year with odd years to the Plaintiff and even years to the Defendant.
(d) Alternate the Palm Sunday and Easter Sunday between the parties every year with odd years to the Defendant and even years to the Plaintiff.
(e) Alternate July 4th between the parties every year with odd years to the Plaintiff and even years to the Defendant including the entire weekend if legal holiday falls on a weekend or a Friday or Monday.
(f) Alternate Christmas Eve until Christmas morning 10 A.M. between the parties with odd years to the Defendant and even years to the Plaintiff until Christmas morning 10 A.M.; and
(g) Alternate Christmas Day between the parties with odd years to the Plaintiff and even years to the Defendant.

The Court must note that it has struggled with the concept and concern that the financial resources available to the Defendant while at the same time the Plaintiff earns less, works more daylight hours, and was owed child support had some impact on the children's choices. Notwithstanding, this the Appellate case law regarding wishes of the children, their age, their closeness as siblings and the Defendant's efforts regarding the children warrant the change in residential parenting time.[1]

This shall constitute the decision and order of this Court.

[1] Given the fact that New York does not recognize a right for child support for a nonresidential custodial parent. See: Rubin v. Della Salla, 107 AD3d 60, 964 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Appellate Division First Dept. 2013) this decision may very well have a further consequence to the Plaintiff which can only be remedied by legislative action."

Thursday, June 24, 2021

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT


The minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Employment Act (FLSA) apply only to employees.  Courts distinguish between employees, who fall under the protections of the FLSA, and independent contractors, who do not.

On January 6, 2021, the Department of Labor (Department) announced a final rule clarifying the standard for employee versus independent contractor based on, inter alia, an economic reality analysis but on March 12, 2021, the Department issued a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to withdraw this rule after receiving many comments that the rule "is inconsistent with the FLSA’s text and purpose, and would have a confusing and disruptive effect on workers and businesses alike due to its departure from longstanding judicial precedent." The withdrawal was effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register on May 6, 2021. [86 FR 24303].

See Final Rule: Independent Contractor Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act


Wednesday, June 23, 2021

WHEN SETTLING A NEW YORK DISCRIMINATION/HARASSMENT CLAIM WITH CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE


It is a two-stage process. New York General Obligations Law § 5-336 provides:

"1. (a) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no employer, its officers or employees shall have the authority to include or agree to include in any settlement, agreement or other resolution of any claim, the factual foundation for which involves discrimination, in violation of laws prohibiting discrimination, including but not limited to, article fifteen of the executive law, any term or condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action unless the condition of confidentiality is the complainant's preference.

(b) Any such term or condition must be provided in writing to all parties in plain English, and, if applicable, the primary language of the complainant, and the complainant shall have twenty-one days to consider such term or condition. If after twenty-one days such term or condition is the complainant's preference, such preference shall be memorialized in an agreement signed by all parties. For a period of at least seven days following the execution of such agreement, the complainant may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or be enforceable until such revocation period has expired.

(c) Any such term or condition shall be void to the extent that it prohibits or otherwise restricts the complainant from: (i) initiating, testifying, assisting, complying with a subpoena from, or participating in any manner with an investigation conducted by the appropriate local, state, or federal agency; or (ii) filing or disclosing any facts necessary to receive unemployment insurance, Medicaid, or other public benefits to which the complainant is entitled.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any provision in a contract or other agreement between an employer or an agent of an employer and any employee or potential employee of that employer entered into on or after January first, two thousand twenty, that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to any future claim of discrimination is void and unenforceable unless such provision notifies the employee or potential employee that it does not prohibit him or her from speaking with law enforcement, the equal employment opportunity commission, the state division of human rights, a local commission on human rights, or an attorney retained by the employee or potential employee. "

Tuesday, June 22, 2021

A CUSTODY TRIAL IN FAMILY COURT


Mireille M.R. v. Albert R., Date filed: 2021-06-07, Court: Family Court, Kings, Judge: Judge Javier Vargas, Case Number: 268765:

"DECISION & ORDER Upon the foregoing papers, the evidentiary virtual bench trial presided by the undersigned from March 16 to May 6, 2021, the exhibits admitted into evidence and for the following reasons, the Petition by Petitioner Mireille R. (hereinafter “Mother”) and the Cross Petition by Albert R. (hereinafter “Father”), for custody and visitation of the parties’ Children, are granted in part and denied in part in accordance with the following decision.

 I.

After meeting on a neighborhood street in Brooklyn, New York, in 2013, the Father and Mother dated for two years and got married on October 30, 2015. The Father was born and raised in Jamaica becoming a U.S. citizen after several years in New York, while the Mother immigrated from Haiti and her status remains in transition. Their union procreated the subject Children, J.R. and T.R. It is undisputed that the Father was the breadwinner of the family, working long hours during the day as a construction foreman and in the evening as a taxi driver, while the Mother remained at home as the homemaker and primary caretaker of the Children. With his salary, he would cover all the family expenses and carrying charges of their marital residence located at 927 East 87th Street in Brooklyn, New York, including electricity, telephone, car payments, cable, and the home mortgage. The family lived together for five years at that residence with the Mother’s adult daughter from a previous union, Shirley Byron, age 23, who helped in the childcare and housing chores.

Although known to the household, the family kept secret the Father’s acts of domestic violence against the Mother throughout the marriage, as related at trial and evidenced by New York State Domestic Incident Reports and Court Ordered Investigations (“COI”) conducted by the New York City Administration for Children Services (“ACS”). However, on June 4, 2018, it was the Father who cynically commenced a Family Offense proceeding against the Mother in Kings County Family Court, alleging that she had verbally mistreated him, engaged in hysterics and was “always angering me.” This resulted in the issuance of a Temporary Order of Protection (Vargas, J.) in Father’s favor restraining the Mother from harassing, menacing, stalking, or committing any criminal offense against him. His Petition was eventually dismissed as withdrawn.

By Amended Petition dated July 24, 2018, the Mother then commenced her own Family Offense proceeding against the Father in the same court, alleging that he has engaged in a pattern of threats, menacing and harassment by constantly yelling, cursing and belittling her in front of the Children; has committed acts of sexual and physical assaults against her; and has tried to choke her after buying groceries for the family in front of the discount department store, BJs, in January 2017. By Temporary Order of Protection dated June 13, 2018, this Court (Vargas, J.) excluded the Father from the marital residence, ordered him to stay away from the Mother, prohibited all communications with her other than regarding custody and visitation issues, precluded him from obtaining a license to carry weapons, and ordered him to refrain from harassing, stalking, assaulting, menacing, sexually touching, or committing any criminal offense against the Mother. That Temporary Order of Protection was extended throughout the proceedings and trials.

Simultaneously, by Petition for Custody dated June 13, 2018, Mother commenced the instant proceeding against Father in Family Court, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ Children, affirming that she “has always been the primary caretaker of the Children,” that Father refuses to help her in caring for the Children complaining that “it is a waste of his time,” and that he never has time to care for them while she works, instead dropping them off at the Paternal Grandmother, Mrs. Rosa Foster’s home. In response, Father filed his own Petition for custody of the Children against the Mother. During the pendency of these proceedings from 2018 until 2021, several Temporary Orders of Visitation (Vargas, J.) were issued by the Undersigned giving the Father alternate weekend visitation with the Children at the Paternal Grandmother’s residence, ordering the parties to refrain from insulting or disparaging each other in front of the Children, or discussing the litigation with them, and prohibiting the infliction of excessive corporal punishment upon the Children. The Court appointed the Children’s Law Center as the Attorney for the Children.

Numerous court appearances before the Undersigned ensued, where the parties lodged several complaints against each other, for instance: complaining that the Father was not always present during the visitation, alleging that the parties left the Children alone, implying that the Father engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with one Child, and accusing the Mother of inflicting corporal punishment upon the Children. The Father repeatedly showed the Court photos of burns sustained by one of the Children while the parties were still together. Based on those allegations, the Court ordered two separate ACS Court Ordered Investigations dated July 2, 2018 and November 24, 2020, which did not find any child protective concerns at either of the parents’ homes. Although the COIs reveal that both parents and their residence were appropriate for the Children, they did not support any of the Father’s allegations against the Mother and showed that the Father relied heavily on the Paternal Grandmother for all homemaking and childcare during his parenting time. Specifically, the November 2020 COI affirmed that Mother has been the primary caretaker and supervisor of the Children since birth, corroborated that Father had physically assaulted her in the past in front of the Children and, relevantly, stated that both Children wanted to live with the Mother and visit with the Father and Grandmother on weekends.

II.

Because the parties did not reach an agreement to settle either their Family Offense or Custody proceedings, the Court presided over two separate trials, commencing with the Family Offense hearing on August 13, 2018, and continuing September 25, 2018, December 19, 2018, and April 1, 2019. During that combined fact-finding and dispositional hearing — which transcript and evidence was incorporated on consent into the custody proceeding, the Mother testified in a credible and consistent manner to several incidents of domestic violence by the Father committed against her mostly in front to the Children. She testified that Father choked her in January 2017, upon returning to their car after buying groceries at the BJ’s Store because he got angry with her about spending money, yelled at her in front of the Children and put his hands around her neck aggressively pressing her neck for one to two minutes until someone passed by and he stopped choking her. She testified that she could not breath, was very scared, and tried to get his hands off, but that thankfully he stopped just when she couldn’t breathe anymore. Her neck hurt all over while he was squeezing it.

Around the month of September 2017, the Mother testified that on two occasions the Father forced her to have sexual relations with him and raped her after coming to her bedroom and telling her that “he wanted to cum” by placing his penis in her mouth and taking off her clothes, all while the Children were sleeping nearby. In an emotional way, she explained that it felt like an order from him to sexually perform because he was constantly insulting her and threatening to call federal agents from the United States’ Immigration Control & Enforcement (“ICE”) to have her deported back to Haiti. In the same vein, sometime in 2018, the Father boasted that he is the master and owner of the house, “he does as he pleases” and that Mother “was his property and could do whatever he wants to do with her.” According to Mother, she felt like she was “nothing,” “no one” and that “she felt better in her country” of Haiti. “She want[ed] to be free as a human being.” She testified that Father had also punched her in the right side of her face and had occasionally put his body on top of her around January 2018. It should be noted that the Court observed that the Father sports a height of 6’1″ and weighs over 280-290 pounds, while the Mother is 5’5′ and weights a little over a hundred pounds.

The Mother also testified that in May 2017, the Father once left his black handgun on his bed in a menacing way for everybody to see, including their Children who were present in the house at the time, making her “feel unsafe” and terrified because he had previously told her “that if he could kill her and the kids, he will.” She took a picture of the gun on the bed, which was admitted into evidence, and informed her Daughter and Paternal Grandmother that “he put the gun where they could see it.” In another occasion, Mother stated that Father put his hands on each side of her pillow and threatened her that “if I could kill you and get away with it, he will kill her.” Throughout the trial, the Mother testified that she was very “afraid” of the Father and detailed other incidents of verbal abuse by him, including yelling at her without reason, insulting and belittling her calling her names like “whore,” “a nobody,” “skank” and “bumbaclott,” which is a vulgar Jamaican insult or an interjection expressing disgust or anger for a person.

Upon cross examination, the Mother testified that she did not call the police or seek medical attention despite the several assaults she suffered from the Father because she was afraid of him, his insults, and his threats to deport her with ICE. She did not tell the police about the handgun incident even though she found it because of that fear of the Father. The Mother further explained that she was also afraid of the police authorities because she is currently undocumented after coming here to New York in a fiancé’s K-1 Visa with another man and overstaying her permit, but that then she met the Father, who married her and applied for her Green Card or permanent residence in the United States. However, she testified to filing two Domestic Incident Reports with the New York Police Department, which showed that nobody was arrested but that she told police about the Father’s abuse and of him having dreamt about having sex with her adult Daughter. She reiterated that she did not ask for help because she was afraid of Father and what he could do. For that same reason, she did not call or go to the Police Precinct despite it being just ten blocks from her home. With that, the Mother concluded her testimony and documentary presentation.

Following the denial of Father’s motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case, the Father’s case began with him testifying that the Mother was merely pursuing the Family Offense proceeding because under the Violence Against Women Act that was the only way that she could get a Green Card without him sponsoring her. He denied ever raping her anally or otherwise because Mother was “insatiable” and “would like to have sex every day.” Father complained that he was paying a lot of money for the Mother’s immigration attorneys and documents, and claimed that Mother got angry with him after her immigration application was denied. He blanketly denied ever threatening, sexually abusing, hitting, or doing any harm to Mother, and although acknowledging that they had their arguments, he claimed that it was the Mother who was aggressive towards him. He acknowledged always shopping at BJ’s, but nothing about the choking incident.

Next to testify was the Paternal Grandmother, who testified that she sees the Mother almost five times a week and has a very close relationship with her, even talking about romantic relationships. The Grandmother testified that she had never seen the parties arguing, choking, or hitting each other, except for one occasion when Mother came to her home in 2018 saying that she was going to leave Father. Mother never mentioned to her that he was abusive verbally, sexually, physically, or otherwise. However, on cross examination, the Grandmother acknowledged that she mostly visited the Mother during the day when Father was working or absent, so that may provide an explanation as to why she never saw them arguing.

After concluding the trial and deliberating on April 1, 2019, the Family Court found the Mother credible in that she established that Father committed several family offenses against her and created an environment of fear and apprehension, preventing her from going to the police, the doctor or seeking help. Specifically, the Undersigned found that the Father had committed the family offenses of attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§110.00, 120.00), harassment in the second degree (Penal Law §126.40), sexual misconduct (Penal Law §130.20), forcible touching (Penal Law §130.52), and criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation (Penal Law §121.11), and further found the existence of aggravating circumstances against him in that he had committed some of the family offenses in the presence of the Children, had used a gun to scare the Mother, and there was physical injury to her.

Thereupon, on April 1, 2019, the Court issued a final Order of Protection (Vargas, J.) for five years directing the Father, among other things, to stay away from the Mother, her home and place of employment; to refrain from assaulting, harassing, menacing, or committing any criminal offense against her; to refrain from communicating with her, except for custody & visitation issues; and prohibiting him from obtaining a license to carry weapons, until and including March 31, 2024. Upon Father’s appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld the five-year Final Order of Protection against him, with a minor modification (see Matter of Royal v. Royal, ___AD3d___, 2020 NY Slip Op 06130 [2nd Dept. 2020]).

III.

While the case was sub judice, the terrible Covid-19 Pandemic descended upon the World temporary paralyzing nonemergency matters pending in all New York courts, and thereby requiring the implementation of virtual proceedings and conferences using Skype and then Microsoft Teams platforms. All counsel and parties in the Family Court became proficient and began utilizing the virtual format for their pending proceedings. Several conferences were held virtually in this case via Teams before the Undersigned. Despite the Final Order of Protection against him, the Father recalcitrantly wanted to pursue the Children’s custody claiming that the Mother was neglectful, immoral and unworthy of custody.1

Since trial courts have wide latitude and discretion regarding trial procedure (see CPLR 4011; Family Court Act 165), the Undersigned presided over the bench trial on a virtual basis after the parties consented on the record to the same (see C.C. v. A.R., 69 Misc. 3d 983, 988-989 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2020]). The custody trial began on March 16, 2021, continued on March 17, 2021, and concluded on May 6, 2021. The first witness to testify was the Mother who testified that she has always been the primary caretaker of the Children, has attended to their educational and medical needs, has always being the one going to parent/teacher conferences and arranged for the Children’s playdates and extracurricular activities. The Mother specifically testified about their son, Taylor, who would misbehave in school, hit other children in the classroom, and throw himself on the floor with tantrums, when the Father was home. Taylor also had speech and mispronunciation issues, and that she alone arranged for speech and other therapies for him. She maintained that after the Father moved out of the residence, that Child has been doing well in school, became a “real model in his class,” and has demonstrated an intelligence and multiplication ability not seen before. She also spoke about her other Child, J.R., who had just started kindergarten, and could not stay calm and still, but who has also improved his conduct since the Father’s departure.

The Mother testified that a typical day at their residence commences with her making breakfast for the Children, arranging for them to take showers, eating breakfast, and getting them ready for school and getting a car service to take them to school. After school, she is the one who welcomes them back home, makes them wash up, have a snack, do their homework with her help, and eat the dinner she prepared. Other than the Maternal Grandfather and her Daughter, the Mother readily acknowledged that the Paternal Grandmother constitutes her support system and a big help for her, frequently visits the family, and provides childcare when she works. The Mother is the one who cleans up the house every day, sometimes with the Children’s help by picking up their toys and shoes. The Children are “very healthy and have no major illnesses,” she schedules appointments and takes them to the doctor and dentist. The Mother also testified that for fun the Children like to dance to music, play hide and seek, solve puzzles, and play with spelling games to help them with their spelling, grammar, and writing. Because of the advent of the Covid Pandemic, they currently do not have many playdates at this time, but play with their cousins and she plans to engage them in more extracurricular activities once the Pandemic subsides.

The Mother acknowledged that she disciplines the Children sometimes by slapping their wrists, forbidding television or by making them read a book to think about what they did wrong. She considers her strongest assets to be very loving, sacrificing and doing everything to better their Children, and spoiling them to a fault. After the Father left, she testified that she was finally able to work more outside the home, and got a job two to three times a week as a certified nursing assistant at the Borough Park Nursing Home and the Chateau Nursing Home in Brooklyn. She was forced to work because the Father has failed to provide financial help for them and owes her over $60,000 in child support. In fact, in November 2020, the Mother offered the Father to have visitation every weekend in order for her to have more time to work to support the family. However, the Father declined that offer, despite the Court issuing a Visitation Order to that effect on the record in open court. When she works, it is only the Maternal Grandfather, Paternal Grandmother and her adult Daughter who provide childcare assistance.

In fact, Mother testified that the Father has never shown much interest in the Children, their education, their speech therapy and has never gone to the school or parent/teacher conferences always claiming that he “is too busy.” She maintained that he has never questioned or shown interest in her decisions regarding the Children’s medical issues, education or religious upbringing. Only once did the Father objected to the Children getting a vaccine, but it was a school requirement and she went ahead to inoculate them. Despite all this, the Mother affirmed that she would foster a good relationship between the Children and Father for “whatever he wants to do,” any additional time and activities that he would like them to be engaged with him. She claimed to have “no hatred towards the Father even though they cannot be together,” and will put the Children’s interests first and give him whatever visitation he wishes.

On cross examination, the Mother recognized that she has reported the Father to the Administration for Children Services because the Children have been hurt under his care or, in her view, exposed to inappropriate things at Father’s residence. On one occasion, the Paternal Uncle Michael Foster — who has mental issues of schizophrenia — slapped one of the Children at the Grandmother’s house and ACS recommended not to leave the Children alone with him. On another occasion, in June 2019, one of the Children fell in the park and broke his arm while under the supervision of the Father and Grandmother, prompting Mother to call ACS. Those ACS investigations were unfounded against the Father for child protective issues. Mother then rested her case for custody.

In response, Father commenced his case with his direct examination testifying that he was born in Jamaica, and lives in a private home with the Paternal Grandmother and his brother, the Paternal Uncle. He stated that he has a religious education from the Clearview Ministry Bible Study. He explained that he met Mother in 2013, but did not want to get married to her, who had come to America with a man from Haiti and broke up with him, and that she got pregnant almost immediately which caused him to get “upset” and “mad for five months.” However, he eventually came around to accept the Child and they had another one and lived at the marital residence together for five years. Although the Father was always gainfully employed during the marriage and supported the family and their living expenses, he claimed that he is not currently working full-time since November 2018, because he suffered an injury and has several surgeries to his back pending and claims to be earning only $400 per week with Uber and some construction works. However, he owns the marital residence where the Mother and Children reside, but claims that the mortgage payments have not been paid, it is in foreclosure and he “cannot afford anything.” He has three other children from another mother.

The Father further testified that the subject Children visit him twice a month and that he “has a great time with Children and take them to places,” like the park or the zoo. He candidly acknowledged that he “never sees the Children alone because the Grandmother is always with them…we are never alone.” The Grandmother “is always there and his other three kids come over when these kids come.” Although the Father complained that the Children are not appropriately dressed for the weather and appear to be always hungry when the visitation starts, he “just play around [and] have fun” with them and “watch TV together.” He emphasized that he “just play and enjoy my time with the kids there.” If he were granted custody, the Father testified that he would impart good morals to the Children and “groom them to achieve more in life,” than with the Mother, who “lacks morals.”

The Father’s mood turned sour when he started testifying about the Mother saying that she was a “bad housekeeper,” “not a fit parent” and showed photos to the Court of a cluttered kitchen sink, dirty toilet and bathroom and claimed that the house was full of cockroaches when they were together. According to Father, the Mother was always sitting on the couch, chatting on the phone or watching television with the Children. He testified that the Mother has a bad relationship with the Paternal Grandmother, her own family and the Maternal Grandfather. Although he claimed that Mother spanks the Children all the time, he then testified that he “do[es]n’t think these kids are growing within a discipline” and are totally unruly and ungovernable. On the other hand, he “never hits the children.” He also complained that the Mother never had time for the Children and never watched them carefully at home, and that is why the Children got hurt sometimes. In fact, he testified that the Mother went to Florida to “meet with a man” regarding her immigration status and stayed there for six days without planning for the Children’s care here in New York. He stated that he “cannot believe anything from” the Mother, “not a word she says;” “she does not love the Children.”

On cross examination, the Father testified that he has not lived with the Children since 2018 and that he does not know where they go to school, their teachers and “doesn’t know what is going on” with them. He has never asked for the Children’s reports card or progress report, nor bought any books for the Children to help them with their reading, nor any clothing for them as the Grandmother is the one who does that. Nothing prohibited him from obtaining the Children’s school information or records. Although he had seen the Child J.R. having educational delays, the Father testified that he will “not go out of the way” to address J.R.’s educational and spelling issues, but will hire someone to help him. He didn’t know at what time the Children woke up or when they went to sleep because he was always working. Although the Father complained that the house was dirty and unkept upon returning home from work, he never offered to help the Mother with the chores or cleaned the house, because “she made the mess” so she has to clean it. He had never made a report to anyone against the Mother about the house being full of cockroaches and rats, or her hitting the Children or their alleged constant hunger and challenged cleanliness. The Father rested and concluded his case presentation.

On May 6, 2021, after almost four years of trial in the Family Offense and Custody proceedings, all parties rested their cases and summed up with the Father asking the Court for “100 percent custody” arguing that the Mother is an unfit and neglectful parent who lies, travels without the Children, “may have had an extramarital affair,” and only got married to him and pregnant to get her Green Card or permanent residence in the United States. He provided no proposed schedule of parenting time, vacation time or any alternative schedules in the event that the Mother were granted custody. In her summation, the Mother maintains that she should be granted custody of the Children because she has been the primary caretaker of the Children since birth, enrolled them in school, takes them to their doctors’ appointments, and take care of all their needs. She convincingly argued that the Father had “disengaged from the Children’s lives” and only sees them during the weekend without asking about their schooling, teachers, or their health. She suggested that the same visitation schedule be continued for the Father on alternate weekends.

In her summation, the Attorney for the Children supports that custody should go to the Mother with significant visitation to Father. Although both parties have credibility issues, the Attorney for the Children argued that the Mother is not so concerned about the Father’s care of the Children as she has permitted visitation uninterrupted. She suggested that perhaps a 50/50 split in physical custody would work. At the completion of the trial and summations, the Court reserved decision and administratively adjourned the matter for the same to June 10, 2021.

IV.

A court deciding an initial custody petition must determine what is in the children’s best interests, the paramount consideration in any custody dispute (see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]; Matter of McFarlane v. Jones, ___AD3d___, 2021 NY Slip Op 02392 [2nd Dept. 2021]). The court must consider, among other things, “(1) which alternative will best promote stability; (2) the available home environments; (3) the past performance of each parent; (4) each parent’s relative fitness, including his or her ability to guide the child, provide for the child’s overall well-being, and foster the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent; and (5) the child’s desires” (Matter of Khan v. Potdar, ___AD3d___, 2019 NY Slip Op 72783[U], lv denied 36 NY3d 902 [2020]; see Matter of Supangkat v. Torres, 101 AD3d 889, 890 [2nd Dept. 2012]). Additionally, if domestic violence is alleged, and proven by a preponderance of the evidence, “the court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child,” along with all the other relevant factors (Domestic Relations Law §240[1][a]; see Matter of Eckstein v. Young, 176 AD3d 813, 815 [2nd Dept. 2019]; Matter of Biancoviso v. Barona, 150 AD3d 990, 992 [2nd Dept. 2017]; Matter of Wissink v. Wissink, 301 AD2d 36, 39 [2nd Dept. 2002]). Ultimately, “inasmuch as a court’s custody determination is dependent in large part upon its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, the court’s exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed if supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (Matter of Supangkat v. Torres, 101 AD3d at 890; see Matter of Rulinsky v. West, 107 AD3d 1507 [2nd Dept. 2013]).

Applying these principles to the matter at bar, the Court hereby awards sole legal and physical custody to Mother. This Court has been presiding over this litigation since 2018, has seen the parties numerous times, is very familiar with the issues in the case and with the parties’ demeanor. The record shows that both parents love the subject Children in their own way, but that the Mother is better suited to provide for the overall well-being of the Children’s lives. She has always been the primary caretaker of the Children, has attended to their educational, therapeutic and medical needs, has always being the one going to parent/teacher conferences and has arranged for the Children’s playdates and extracurricular activities. While the Mother showed a nuanced understanding of the Children and their emotional and educational needs and wants, the Father himself displayed a patriarchal point of view, disengaged from the Children and characterized his relationship with the Children as one of just playing and having a good time.

Perhaps because the Father appears to lack formal higher education, his testimony and actions made clear that the Children’s education was not a priority for him. He was not aware — or seemed to seriously care — about the Children’s school, educational deficits, extracurricular activities or medical necessities. On the other hand, the Mother diligently arranges for the Children to attend school, either in person or virtually, and is available to help, encourage and supervise them during the school day. It was undisputed that both Children are doing really well in school. If she has to work, she has family members who can watch the Children including the Grandfather, her Daughter and the Paternal Grandmother. Although the Father professes to love the Children and care about their wellbeing, actions speak louder than words. He has submitted no evidence of any assistance that he has provided to the Mother in caring for the Children, financially or otherwise; he owes significant child support arrears and is letting their residence go into foreclosure. It thus become clear that the Mother has continuously been the Children’s only caretaker, emotional supporter and education supervisor throughout their lives, such that awarding her sole custody would “promote stability,” enrich their educational potential and provide a loving home environment for the Children (Matter of Recher v. Velez, 143 AD3d 828, 829 [2nd Dept. 2016]).

Not only is the Mother clearly better able to provide for the Children’s wellbeing, but she is also more likely to foster their relationship with the Father than he would with respect to the Children’s relationship with her (see Matter of Eckstein v. Young, 176 AD3d at 814-815; Matter of Saylor v. Bukowski, 170 AD3d 862, 863 [2nd Dept. 2019]). Some courts have found that an unwillingness to facilitate that relationship is “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the [parent] is unfit to act as a custodial parent” (see Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 AD2d 380, 384 [2d Dept 1978]). Throughout the trial here, the Father has displayed a bitterness and poorly veiled hatred toward the Mother, insulting her morals, her truthfulness, and her overall fitness as a mother on the record in open court. Indeed, he would not answer when he was asked whether he will foster the Children’s relationship with the Mother. This condescension towards the Mother would be totally incompatible with an award of custody to the Father.

Moreover, the Court verily believes that an award of custody to the Father will merely translate into an award of custody to the Grandmother or his Adult Daughter, Nia Royal, given his anachronistic paternal views and his apparent disengagement from the Children. The Father testified repeatedly at trial that he would never be left alone taking care of the Children. Either the Grandmother or his Daughter would always be present. In fact, even when the Mother traveled to Florida to visit her brother and work on her immigration papers for a week, the Father declined to stay with the Children for those days or make proper arrangements for their care, instead shipping them to their babysitter’s house or to the Paternal Grandmother for their care. His repeated claims that the Mother was a terrible homemaker reigning over a rat and cockroach infested house, are belied by the COIs in evidence describing a clean, neat and organized house.

Finally, having the benefit of observing the witnesses’ demeanor and listening to their testimony firsthand during the Family Offense and the Custody proceedings, the Court finds the Mother more credible than the Father as to the allegations of domestic violence. Consistent with the Family Offense proceeding, this Court credits her testimony that he had committed several acts of domestic violence against her in the past, including in front of the Children, which weighs against awarding the Father custody of the Children (see Matter of Eckstein v. Young, 176 AD3d at 815; Matter of Felty v. Felty, 108 AD3d 705, 707 [2nd Dept. 2013]; Costigan v. Renner, 76 AD3d 1039, 1040 [2nd Dept. 2010]). The Children apparently described the Father when angry as looking like the fictional character, Hulk. Even one of the Children, T.R., was mimicking the Father’s aggressive behavior by hitting his brother and other children in school, but that behavior disappeared once the Father left the marital residence and their interaction was reduced to visitation. Based on all that, as advocated by the Attorney for the Children, the Father should be awarded liberal visitation rights with a clearly delineated code of conduct wherein he is prohibited from displaying to the Children his anger and condescension for the Mother.

V.

In accordance with the foregoing, this Court hereby grants Mother’s Petition for Custody to her, denies Father’s Cross Petition for custody, and issues the following Final Order of Custody and Visitation:

1. The Mother shall have sole legal and physical custody of the Children.

2. The Father shall have alternate weekend visitation with the Children from Saturdays at 4:00 p.m. to Sundays at 6:00 p.m., commencing on November 27, 2020.

3. The Father is to arrange for the Paternal Grandmother to do all the pick-ups of the Children for his visitation at Mother’s residence curbside, and the Mother shall be responsible for picking up the Children at the end of visitation at Grandmother’s residence. Upon the expiration of the Final Order of Protection, the Father shall do all the exchanges curbside at Mother’s residence.

4. Both parties shall have liberal and reasonable electronic/telephonic access with the Children when they are with the other parent.

5. In addition, the parties shall share other times as follows:

a. The Mother will have Mother’s Day each year, and the Father will have Father’s Day each year.

b. February school break: The Father will have the February school break each year.

c. In Even years, the Father will have the Spring/April school break. In odd years the Mother will have that break.

d. In even years, the Father will have Easter Day. In odd years, the Mother will have Easter Day.

e. In odd years, the Father will have Thanksgiving Day. In even years, the Mother will have Thanksgiving Day.

f. In odd years, the Father will have Christmas Eve and the Mother will have Christmas Day. In even years, the Mother will have Christmas Eve and the Father will have Christmas Day. In addition, in even years the Father will have the December school break from the last day of school until New Year’s Day at 3:00 p.m. In odd years, the Mother will have the December school break under the same terms.

g. On the Children’s birthday, each parent shall see the Children on that special day.

6. The Father shall also be entitled to four (4) weeks of time with the Children each summer (July-August). The Father shall notify the Mother of the weeks he is selecting by May 15th of each year. Both parties will be permitted to travel outside of the state and country with the Children on advanced notice to the other parent with a full itinerary of dates, travel, hotels, and contact information where the Children can be reached at all times.

7. There should be any other visitation as agreed upon between the parties. The parties may also modify or expand the schedule on mutual consent in writing.

8. Neither of the parties is to insult or disparage the other to or in the presence of the Children, nor to discuss these proceedings with or in the presence of the Children.

9. Neither the parents nor third parties shall inflict excessive corporal punishment on the Children.

10. The Children shall be under adult supervision at all times during the visitation.

11. Father shall have access to the Children’s educational, medical, dental and extracurricular activities with the Mother adding the Father’s name to the school’s BlueCard and providing him the initial information.

12. During the Covid Pandemic, the parents are to provide the Children with masks/cloth face coverings, engage them in frequent handwashing and practice social distancing as required by government regulations.

13. The Mother is also ordered to provide the Father with copies of the Children’s Social Security cards, passports, and medical forms as soon as practicable.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court. The June 10, 2021 court appearance is hereby canceled.

NOTICE:

Pursuant to Section 1113 of the Family Court Act, an appeal from this Order must be taken within 30 days of receipt of the Order by Appellant in Court, 35 days from the date of mailing of the Order to the Appellant by the Clerk of Court, or 30 days after service by a party or the Attorney for the Child upon the Appellant, whichever is earliest.

Check applicable box:

Order mailed on (specify date[s] and to whom mailed):

Dated: June 7, 2021

Footnotes

1. During a virtual court conference via Microsoft Teams, the Father's counsel respectfully requested for the Court to help him dissuade the Father from going to trial to pursue custody of the Children, based on the existence of the Final Order of Protection against him and the fact that his visitation was going well. The Court delicately informed the Father that, although it will keep an open mind and hear all evidence in the case, precedent generally would not support an order of custody to him given the existence of the five-year Final Order of Protection, which was just affirmed on appeal. Interrupting, the Father engaged in an angry diatribe belittling the court proceedings, stating that the Mother had accused him of putting his penis on one of the Children's butt and how could she be custodian and give him more visits, does "she wants me to continue raping my Child?" Neither the Court nor the Attorney for the Child was aware of that shocking allegation. He also started threatening counsel that whoever gives custody to Mother "should have a slow and painful death." The Court warned the Father not to engage in any behavior which might be construed as threatening the Court or counsel, or he could be held in contempt of court.