NY - LITIGATING ANONYMOUSLY CAN BE ACHIEVED IN LIMITED CASES

Doe v. ARCHDIOCESE OF NY, 2025 NY Slip Op 50338 - NY Co. Supreme Court 2025:

"Plaintiff moves, by Order to Show Cause, for permission from this court to proceed anonymously during this action.

Plaintiff argues that allowing plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym would protect plaintiff from the stigma associated with sexual assault that may result upon disclosure of their identity in the instant matter. Plaintiff, like many other similarly situated plaintiffs, is concerned that disclosure of their identity will further stigmatize plaintiff, (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 3 ¶ 9).

The Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law ("GMVA"), revives previously time-barred claims for "crime[s] of violence motivated by gender." (New York Administrative Code, Chapter 11 §§ 10-1101 — 10-1107).

The court finds that, based upon the affidavits of service, defendants were duly served with the instant Order to Show Cause, and none of them submitted opposition. (NYSCEF Doc No. 6, 7). While the relief herein is unopposed, the court has determined that a decision reflecting its deliberation on the application herein is warranted.

In general, "[t]he determination of whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously requires the court to use its discretion in balancing plaintiff's privacy interest against the presumption in favor of open trials and against any prejudice to defendant" (Anonymous v. Lerner, 124 AD3d 487, 487 [1st Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Doe v. Yeshiva Univ., 195 AD3d 565, 565 [1st Dept 2021]; see also Doe v. MacFarland, 66 Misc 3d 604 [Sup Ct 2019]; Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., 2008 NY Slip Op 31382 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]; J. Doe No. 1 v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 24 AD3d 215 [1st Dept 2005]). Among the recognized values of open access to civil proceedings is that "the bright light cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud" (Danco Labs. v. Chemical Works of Gedeon Richter, 274 AD2d 1, 7, [1st Dept 2000]). Likewise, the very openness of the process should provide the public "with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fairness" and serves to "ensure that [the proceedings] are conducted efficiently, honestly and fairly" (Danco, 274 AD2d at 7, supra).

However, the right of the public, and the press, to access judicial proceedings is not absolute or unfettered, and involves judicial discretion (Doe v. Yeshiva Univ., 195 AD3d 565 at 565; Anonymous v. Lerner, 124 AD3d 487, 487) Moreover, access may still be respected in keeping with constitutional requirements while sensitive information is restricted in keeping with "the State's legitimate concern for the well-being" of an individual (Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 [1982]).

In addition, while "[i]t is elementary that the primary function of a pleading is to apprise an adverse party of the pleader's claim", the same does not necessarily apply to a pleader's name (Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 93 NY2d 34, 40 [1999]).

Here, there can be little doubt that plaintiff's case will involve information of a personal and highly sensitive nature. Plaintiff alleges that they are the victim of sexual assault and that as a result they have suffered significant physical, emotional, and psychological injuries (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, ¶¶ 27-28) Defendants have neither opposed plaintiff's motion, nor do they make their own motion for anonymity. Because defendants are institutions, this Court cannot infer the same sort of personal risks apply to defendants. As such, based upon the unopposed motion and the documents received and reviewed, the court does not find that Defendants would be prejudiced at this time by the court granting plaintiff's Order to Show Cause to proceed anonymously.

An express purpose of the GMVA is to revive previously time-barred claims. (New York Administrative Code, Chapter 11 § 10-1105) Revealing plaintiff's identity may have a chilling effect on plaintiff in litigating the instant matter, and on other plaintiffs from pursuing similar litigation. (see e.g. John Doe No. 4 v. Rockefeller Univ., 2019 NY Slip Op. 33725[U], *2, 2019 WL 6354255 [Sup. Ct., NY County Nov. 22, 2019]). Such would directly contradict the express legislative purpose of the GMVA. (New York Administrative Code, Chapter 11 § 10-1102)

Granting anonymity to Plaintiff is a far less drastic limitation on the public's right to open proceedings than the sealing of records. (Doe v. New York Univ., 6 Misc 3d 866, 878 [Sup Ct 2004]). Plaintiff has not moved for sealing of the records. The public interest in seeing this case determined on the merits outweighs the public interest in knowing plaintiff's identity. (Doe v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 66 Misc 3d 444, 449 [Sup Ct 2019]).

Anonymity at this stage in the proceeding ensures that plaintiff will proceed with the action and effectuate that goal."

NY - LANDLORD CAN'T COLLECT RENT IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT WITH ILLEGAL APARTMENT

Here I am assuming there was a prior summary proceeding in L&T Court, the landlord wanted the premises and entered into a stipulation for immediate surrender and hoped to collect rent in a plenary action.

NELSON-TAYLOR v. Brooks, 2025 NY Slip Op 50314 - NY: City Court, Queens Civil Court 2025:

"A small claims trial was conducted wherein the claimant landlord seeks rent owed in the amount of $9,375. There is really no dispute the defendants, tenants in a two-family dwelling, owe the rent sought. The defendants argue they are not required to pay the rent since the dwelling contained an illegal basement apartment which suspended the landlord's right to collect rent from any tenant. The landlord disputed that any illegal residence existed in the basement. The court heard testimony and has reviewed that testimony as well as all the evidence submitted.

On December 1, 2007 the parties entered into a one year lease for a unit located at 246-11 Memphis Avenue in Rosedale, New York. In September 2019 the tenants stopped paying rent and the landlord commenced a landlord-tenant action. The parties entered into a stipulation on February 3, 2020 and the defendants agreed to vacate the premises. The rental arrears, the subject of this action, were severed pursuant to the stipulation agreement. As noted, the defendants argue they cannot be required to pay any rent since the existence of an illegal apartment rendered the premises subject to the Multiple Dwelling Law. This designation required the landlord to obtain a new certificate of occupancy to conform to the change of use within the premises. Without such certificate of occupancy they assert they do not have to pay any rent. The claimant asserts the basement was not used as an additional dwelling and there is no basis for the defendants to withhold rent that is owed.

Conclusions of Law

A review of all the evidence demonstrates the defendants sufficiently established the basement apartment was used as an additional dwelling. The defendants presented testimony as well as supporting documentation in the form of photographs and documents that establish another individual resided in the basement. Thus, the defendants satisfied their burden regarding their defense of nonpayment of rent. However, that does not end the inquiry. The next question that must be addressed is whether an illegal apartment suspends the payment of rent by every tenant of the premises.

Multiple Dwelling Law §301(1) states that no multiple dwelling may be occupied without a valid certificate of occupancy. Further, Multiple Dwelling Law §302(1)(a) and (b) states that if a dwelling is occupied in whole or in part without a certificate of occupancy then "no rent shall be recovered by the owner of such premises for said period" (id). Therefore, if a building does not maintain a valid certificate of occupancy then no rent may be collected from any unit (Caldwell v. American Package Company Inc., 57 AD3d 15, 866 NYS2d 275 [2d Dept., 2008]). However, there is a disagreement whether rent can be collected from a legal apartment in a building that also maintained illegal units for which no certificate of occupancy existed. For example, in De La Cruz v. Miller, 2023 WL 5351006 [Supreme Court Kings County 2023] the court noted that "although the lack of a proper certificate of occupancy for a rent-controlled apartment precludes a landlord from recovering rent or use and occupancy for that apartment, it does not preclude a landlord from recovering rent or use and occupancy for apartments unaffected by the certificate of occupancy violations" (id). Again, in Santiago v. Perez, 1992 NYLJ LEXIS 8800 [Civil Court Queens County 1992] the court held that tenants of a legal unit could not avoid paying rent merely because an illegal unit existed if the tenants of the lawful unit were unaffected by the illegal possession. The court concluded it would be "inequitable" and akin to unjust enrichment to permit the tenants of a lawful unit to avoid rent merely because an apartment unit in the building was illegal. Recently, in Taubes v. Yorkshire House Associates LLC, 2024 WL 1117155 [Supreme Court New York County 2024] the court again held that the tenant of a lawful apartment was required to pay rent where that apartment was unaffected by any certificate of occupancy violations in other portions of the building (see, also, Chan v. Kormendi, 118 Misc 2d 1026, 462 NYS2d 943 [Civil Court Queens County 1983] finding that prohibiting a landlord from receiving rent from a legal apartment because an illegal basements exists is "inequitable" and "grossly injurious" and that "the penalty or sanction should fit the crime" [id]).

There are cases, indeed, the majority of cases, that hold the exact opposite, namely the failure to maintain a valid certificate of occupancy exempts every tenant from paying rent. Thus, in West 47th Holdings LLC v. Eliyahu, 64 Misc 3d 133(A), 116 NYS3d 843 [Supreme Court Appellate Term First Department 2019]) the landlord subdivided two apartments into four units which required a new certificate of occupancy. The court held that without that new certificate, any occupancy was in violation of Multiple Dwelling Law §301 and consequently no action for the nonpayment of rent was permissible. The court concluded this was true "even if tenant's apartment was not one of the newly created apartments" (id). Again, in 936 TYH RM Bronx LLC v. Brujan, 2022 WL 15524927 [Civil Court Bronx County 2022] an illegal unit existed in the cellar of the premises. The court held that no rent could be collected rent from any tenant "even if the tenant's unit is not the illegal unit" (id, see, also, 1165 Fulton Ave HDFC v. Goings, 65 Misc 3d 1210(A), 119 NYS3d 9 [Civil Court New York County 2019], GMT 3435 Realty LLC v. Hyman, 83 Misc 3d 1287(A), 216 NYS3d 508 [Civil Court Bronx County 2024], GVS Properties LLC v. Vargas, 59 Misc 3d 128(A), 100 NYS3d 609 [Appellate Term First Department 2018], 208 Nimrod Street LLC v. Irizarry, 42 Misc 3d 145(A), 988 NYS2d 526 [Appellate Division Second Department 2014], Kaloedas v. Garcia, 76 Misc 3d 482, 174 NYS3d 194 [City Court Yonkers 2022], 28 Poplar LLC v. Matos, 2023 NYLJ LEXIS 2023 [City Court Yonkers 2023] both interpreting identically worded Multiple Residence Law §302-a).

Considering these conflicting results a review of the statutory definitions that govern these facts will prove helpful. Pursuant to MDL §4(7) a multiple dwelling is defined as "a dwelling that is either rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied, or is occupied as the residence or home of three or more families living independently of each other" (id). Where the owner of a legal two-family dwelling converts a basement to a residential unit then the building is classified as a de facto multiple dwelling. Further, "an owner of a de facto multiple dwelling who fails to obtain a proper certificate of occupancy or comply with the registration requirements of the Multiple Dwelling Law cannot recover rent or use and occupancy" (Malden v. Wykoff S.P. LLC, 192 AD3d 1002, 146 NYS3d 143 [2d Dept., 2021], see, also, Shiela Properties Inc., v. A Real Good Plumber Inc., 59 AD3d 424, 874 NYS2d 145 [2d Dept., 2009]). A strained reading of those cases supports the argument that only the tenant of the illegally converted unit need not pay rent but the other tenants must, in fact, pay rent. The natural reading of those cases supports the tenant's argument that no tenant must pay rent if any unit does not conform to the certificate of occupancy. Moreover, Multiple Dwelling Law §301(1) and §302(1)(a) and (b) states that "no rent shall be recovered" for any "dwelling or structure" that is "occupied in whole or in part" without a certificate that "said dwelling conforms in all respects" to the Multiple Dwelling Law (id). That language further supports the assertion that no rent can be collected, even from units that are legal, if some illegality renders the certificate of occupancy invalid in any respect. Concerning arguments this result is unfair or unjust (Chan v. Kormendi, supra) or can perhaps be manipulated by an unscrupulous tenant of a legal apartment to avoid paying rent by facilitating the existence of an illegal apartment (see, The Barring of rent in the Absence of a Certificate of Occupancy-A Rule Still in Much Need of Clarification, by Nativ Winiarsky, New York Law Journal, September 6, 2023) such arguments must properly be raised to the Legislature (see, Chazon LLC v. Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410, 948 NYS3d 571 [2012]). This court cannot ignore the plain reading of the statutes and cases that have followed such plain readings in favor of cases, however reasonable from policy perspectives, that do not adhere to such plain readings of the statutes. This court is bound to conclude that since the dwelling in this case was a de facto multiple dwelling no tenant was required to pay rent. Therefore, the request for rent is consequently denied. Lastly, any request for attorney fees is denied."

NY - NAME AND SEX CHANGE APPLICATION SEALED EVEN THOUGH NOT REQUESTED

Perhaps the court took this step, as the petitioner was pro se.

MATTER OF JW, 2025 NY Slip Op 25048 - NY: King Co.
City Court, Civil Court 2025:

"This Honorable Court Decides and Orders Sua Sponte, upon Application of Petitioner JW identified as non-binary seeking Declaratory Judgment for Name Change and Sex Designation to X, pursuant to the Civil Rights Law §64-a and §67-b to Seal Court Records is hereby under separate Sealed Order Granted.

Herein, Petitioner seeks a change of name and sex designation change to X to coincide with their non-binary identification, in one of the very limited matters in which this court sits as a court of equity pursuant to the 2021 Gender Recognition Act of the Civil Rights Law Article 6. In sitting as a court of equity in such ex-parte petition for declaratory judgment "`the court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded, imposing such terms as may be just'"(Piccirilli v. Benjamin, 226 AD3d 1233, 1238 [3d Dept 2024]), citing State v. Barone, 74 NY2d 332 [1989]), quoting CPLR 3017 [a]). There are broader considerations of the underpinning legislative intent and history beyond the text of the black letter law in decision-making of such declaratory judgments in equity. Herein, the issue before this court is whether within its powers in equity may sua sponte seal court records of a change of name and sex designation pursuant to NY CLS Civ R §64-a and §67-b where Petitioner does not seek the prayer of relief to seal. This is distinguished from the recently decided matter in which the issue presented was as to the unintended legislative internal inconsistency of the "totality of the circumstances test" pursuant to NY CLS Civ R §64-a as applied to a Transgender person who requests sealing (Matter of KA, 2025 NY Slip Op 50128[U] [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]). This Court is sensitive to not intend to patronize, to not relegate to victimhood nor to detract from the outward Pride of who they are as Transgender people. However, as a Court of Equity, this Court has "the power to dispose of all matters at issue and to grant complete relief in accordance with the equities of the case" (id. at 1237).

To grant full relief here, even where not demanded, requires comprehensive consideration of grave matters of societal public safety protections to Petitioner, not merely confined to this court's geographical jurisdiction. Rather, this Petition is indelible in perpetuity for all to see not merely in Brooklyn, New York City but extending nationally as well as globally. Petitioner's safety in Brooklyn does not necessarily extend to wherever the Transgender person's life may take them in the future. This is indeed a significant life altering change for a member of a community that faces unfortunate consequential public ridicule, discrimination and hate crimes.^[1] Similarly to de jure decree that a Black slave is 3/5 of a human being does not make it factually so, likewise, the de jure decree or edict of the non-existence of Transgender people does not make it factually so. However, such a de jure decree indeed further bolsters the need for public safety protections of that denied demographic. Regardless of the discriminatory de jure edict proclaiming the non-existence of Transgender people, a hate crime against a Transgender person, like any other crime, is against The People. NY CLS Civ R §67 statutorily establishes the sex designation X, which is not universally accepted and actually scorned and reviled in some sectors of society here and abroad. It may be argued that sealing is contrary to a proud Transgender, non-binary, or gender nonconforming person's intent. Historically, the Interracial demographic has statutorily been defined to apply exclusively to Black and White mixed blood pursuant to overruled miscegenation laws, which now have freedom of choice of racial classification without criminal recrimination (see Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 2 [1967]). Prior to the landmark case, the de jure one- drop-rule^[2] statutorily mandated the Interracial to be classified as the Black demographic even though defied by immutable characteristics. Once overturned, a non-Black appearing Interracial with no Black characteristics may choose to openly and proudly publicly choose to self-identify as such. Similarly, the Transgender, non-binary or gender nonconforming person may also choose to live openly and proudly and publicly choose to self-identify as such. Therefore, perhaps in choosing the X gender marker in and of itself is intended to be open and proud. Accordingly, this intent to not choose to seal is an extension and reaffirmation of their proud identification. However, this court in equity is tasked with the holistic implications of its decision upon Petitioner, even where, as here, sealing of the court records is not being demanded.

For the foregoing reasons, This Court Sitting In Equity, notwithstanding that the relief of Sealing was not prayed for relief, in the best interest, and what is just, and right, and good for Petitioner JW's Change of Name and Change of Sex Designation, pursuant to Civil Rights Law §64-a, §67-b, the court records attendant thereto are hereby Ordered Sealed, Sua Sponte.

This constitutes the opinion, order and decision of This Honorable Court.

[1] Office of the New York State Comptroller, https://www.osc.ny.gov/reports/concerning-growth-hate-crime-new-york-state-8/19/2024.

[2] PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jefferson/mixed/onedrop.html."

NOT A DIVORCE, NOT AN ANNULMENT, BUT A REVOCATION

MATTER OF JOHN M. v. REBECCA L., 2025 NY Slip Op 158 - NY: Appellate Div., 1st Dept. 2025:

"In this article 81 proceeding, petitioner moved below to revoke the marriage between the incapacitated person John M. and appellant Helen E. It is well established that marriage is a contract, and pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.29(d), it can be revoked by a court, even if made prior to appointment of a guardian, once it is established that the contract was made while the person was incapacitated (see Matter of Edgar V.L., 228 AD3d 549, 551-552 [1st Dept 2024]; Matter of Nunziata [Nancy K.], 74 Misc 3d 255, 267 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2021]). Unlike an annulled marriage, a marriage revoked pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.29(d) is void ab initio (Matter of Kaminester v. Foldes, 51 AD3d 528, 529 [1st Dept 2008]).

After conducting a hearing on John M.'s capacity to marry, the article 81 court properly revoked the marriage rendering it void ab initio. Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that John M. was incapacitated at the time of the parties' marriage. The temporary guardian, the court evaluator, petitioner, and a longtime close friend of John M., consistently testified that at the time of the June 2022 marriage, John M. lacked the mental capacity to understand the significance of a decision to marry. There is no basis to disturb the credibility determinations of the trial court, which found respondent Helen E.'s testimony not credible, intentionally evasive, nonresponsive, and contradictory.

The marriage took place one month after petitioner, who is John M.'s daughter, commenced the guardianship proceeding based on her concerns about his worsening cognitive impairment and possible financial exploitation. The evidence at the hearing established that Helen E., John M.'s former home health aide from his time in a care facility, was making multiple attempts to marry him while the investigation into John M.'s capacity was ongoing. The article 81 court's determination that John M. was incapacitated and in need of a guardian came mere weeks after the parties' marriage.

Contrary to Helen E.'s assertion, medical evidence was not necessary to prove incapacity (see Matter of Bess Z., 27 AD3d 568, 569 [2d Dept 2006]; Matter of Rosa B.-S. [William M.B.], 1 AD3d 355, 356 [2d Dept 2003])."