FROM THE ABA

 

ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD NEGLECT IN THE AFTERMATH OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Matter of Joshua F. (Hollyann G.) 2021 NY Slip Op 21373 Decided on December 20, 2021 Family Court, Kings County Deane, J. :

"Procedural History and Factual Background

This Court held a fact-finding hearing pursuant to Family Court Act §1044 in this child neglect proceeding against the Respondent mother, Ms. G, over the course of several dates, from April 12, 2021 until November 9, 2021.[FN1]

At the fact-finding hearing, the Petitioner Administration for Children's Services ("Petitioner" or "ACS") called ACS caseworker Ms. Ramjit, and Mr. O, the non-respondent father of the older subject child Kanan, as witnesses. The Respondent called her mother as a witness and testified on her own behalf. The Attorney for the Children ("AFC") did not present any case and argued in favor of a finding of neglect. The Court reserved decision.

ACS originally filed this petition on October 23, 2019. Prior to that date, the two young subject children, Kanan (age 2 at the time) and Joshua (age 9 months), had resided either fully or partially in their mother's care. Ms. G was originally a non-respondent on an earlier neglect petition filed against Joshua's father, Mr. F, on July 26, 2019 which involved allegations of domestic violence against her, specifically that Mr. F punched her in the presence of both small children. At that time, Joshua was released to his mother and Kanan jointly to both of his parents as Ms. G and Mr. O had a previously-entered order of joint custody that allowed each approximately half of the week with him. On October 18, 2021, this Court made a neglect finding against Mr. F based on the evidence of domestic violence presented by ACS at trial which included the emotional, compelling and highly credible testimony of Ms. G who was cooperative in ACS's calling her as a witness. See Order of Fact-Finding, NN-20753-4/19, dated October 18, 2021.

The petition filed against Ms. G alleges neglect based on Ms. G's failure to provide adequate supervision or guardianship. Specifically, the petition alleges that she left Kanan with his father from early September to the date of filing without having any contact with the father or the child and that she left Joshua with his paternal grandmother for approximately the same amount of time also without any contact or provisions until October 2, 2019, when she apologized for disappearing but still did not take Joshua back. Additionally, the petition alleges that the caseworker had been trying to assist the mother with entering PATH in mid-September [*2]but was not able to make contact with her by phone.

Ms. G gave birth to a third son, Julian, on April 30, 2021 and ACS filed another petition against both Ms. G and the baby's father, Mr. F, adding Julian as a subject child on July 15th. Julian is temporarily directly placed with his maternal grandmother with an order that allows the mother to live in the same home and she is currently permitted to be with Julian unsupervised.

Evidence at Fact-finding Hearing

Kanan's father, Mr. O, testified that during his regular parenting time over Labor Day weekend in 2019, he was stabbed and hospitalized for approximately six weeks. He stated that Kanan was with his grandmother from the time this incident happened and that Ms. G did not pick Kanan up as per her regular schedule on Thursday, September 5th. Mr. O spoke to Ms. G from the hospital several times and she stated she planned to enter a family shelter and would pick Kanan up before doing so. However, Mr. O did not hear from the mother again until October and Kanan remained in the care of his family, or with him once he was out of the hospital, during the period alleged in the petition. Mr. O acknowledged that Ms. G did not have his grandmother's phone number or know where she lived and he did not provide it to her, although she did have his aunt's number who lived in the same home. Mr. O also testified that, while Ms. G did not visit him in the hospital, Ms. G's mother did. He stated that he spoke to Ms. G three to four times while he was in the hospital but that, to his knowledge, she did not speak to Kanan.

Caseworker Ramjit's testimony focused on her efforts to assist Ms. G in entering PATH to obtain a shelter placement with the two children as she was aware that Ms. G was a victim of domestic violence by Mr. F and had unstable housing because her mother had "kicked her out" in August. Ms. Ramjit originally messaged Ms. G about entering PATH on September 5, 2019 and then made a specific plan to meet her on September 13th and then pick up the boys to go to PATH. However, when Caseworker Ramjit arrived at the address that the mother had provided, Ms. G was not there and did not respond to texts. The caseworker testified that she tried to reach Ms. G over the next several weeks to make another plan but was unable to reach her until October 22nd. During this period of no contact, each child was with their paternal relatives and the caseworker did not raise any concerns about the care the children received from them. Once Caseworker Ramjit reached the mother, Ms. G explained that she had been working over that time to raise money to care for her children and that she had tried to see Joshua while he was with his paternal grandmother but that Mr. F's family would not let her see him. Ms. G also stated that she had given Joshua's benefit card to his paternal grandmother, who had agreed to care for Joshua, so that she could purchase food and other necessities for him. The caseworker testified that Kanan was with his paternal great-grandmother as Mr. O was in the hospital most of that time. As far as Ms. Ramjit was aware, Ms. G did not see either child during that time.

The maternal grandmother, Martha G, testified that, during the time Mr. O was hospitalized, she had "thrown out" her daughter from the home because she "wanted to teach her a lesson" and get her to grow up because she was choosing the wrong men. In particular, Ms. G felt that her daughter's current partner, Mr. F, had nothing to offer her as he had no job and was beating the Respondent mother up on a regular basis. The grandmother testified credibly that, while they were living together, she would see her daughter crying and with black eyes. On one occasion, she was awakened to the sound of her daughter screaming and crying and saw Mr. F chasing her into her bedroom. Additionally, Martha G stated that Mr. F would call her on the [*3]phone and threaten both her and her daughter, calling her daughter "bitch" and "whore." The grandmother believed her daughter kept going back to Mr. F because she was afraid of him. Although she kicked her daughter out, Ms. G stayed in touch with her and she went to see Mr. O in the hospital on her daughter's behalf. She also testified that she made arrangements to see Kanan through his great-grandmother and that her daughter would come see Kanan while he was in her care and bring him some food and clothes. At one point, her daughter did say she planned to enter a shelter.

Ms. G testified openly and honestly and the Court was impressed by her level of insight and display of vulnerability. Ms. G said she was 19 years old when she got involved with Mr. F and that he had been extremely nice to her in the beginning of their relationship as was his family. She explained that she was looking for a family and that was part of her motivation to be with him. While there were red flags early in her relationship with Mr. F, she did not have a support system and he told her he never loved anyone as much as her. Ms. G testified emotionally about the abuse she suffered over the course of their relationship which began with Mr. F's attempts to control her clothes, looks and behavior and to hurt her emotionally by placing humiliating and demeaning posts on social media. The next year he began beating her regularly with a belt and sticks. Prior to her relationship with Mr. F, Ms. G testified that she had been involved with Mr. O when she was only 18 and he was 25. She stated that there was also a dynamic of power and control used against her in that relationship as well. Mr. O was verbally abusive and wanted her to remain home and cook and clean and only leave the house for school.

During the period relevant to the allegations, Ms. G explained that she was homeless because her mother had kicked her out in August and she felt ashamed because she had no money and no place to live. She was also trying not to be in a relationship with Mr. F as this was after the domestic violence incident that gave rise to the filing of the petition against him. As a result, she was too embarrassed to contact Mr. O's relatives to try to see Kanan so instead she waited until her mother took him for a visit to see him and bring him things. She also called Mr. O in the hospital as a way of checking on Kanan but she did not go see him as he had a new girlfriend so she felt that would be disrespectful; instead Ms. G asked her mother to go see Mr. O for her. Ms. G testified, "I just needed a job. I was working. I was alone. I had nothing." She explained that she wanted to have money before entering the shelter to "feel secure" caring for her kids and that is why she did not enter PATH when she had planned to meet the caseworker. Instead, she had obtained jobs at various places including the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Ms. G also testified that she was trying to see Joshua at the home of Mr. F's relatives but they had moved since the time of their relationship so she did not know the address. At that point, since ACS had filed the case against Mr. F and he was excluded from his relative's home since Joshua was placed there, the family was angry at Ms. G and she testified that his sisters would "try to fight her" if they saw her on the street. Meanwhile, Mr. F would lie to her about their address and send her places that they did not live when she hoped to see Joshua. Ms. G described feeling very alone as "she had no family involved on her side who would get involved like that." Pursuant to this Court's order releasing the subject children to her after a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027 [FN2] in November of 2019, Ms. G did enter a shelter with both boys and [*4]was placed in Queens despite the fact that Kanan's day care was in Brooklyn and her job was in Manhattan. All of the travelling involved made it impossible for Ms. G to manage caring for both boys while maintaining her job and living in the shelter system so she only remained for a month.[FN3] She was honest and heartfelt in stating that she felt worthless and like "everyone was saying [she] was a bad mom."

Legal Analysis

The Respondent in this case is a young mother of two, now three, small children who, the evidence is clear, was a victim of domestic violence on multiple occasions and was subjected to the controlling behavior of her children's two older fathers at a time when she lacked independent family or financial resources. The Court found Ms. G's explanations for the choices she made in the two month period relevant to these allegations, from September to October of 2019, to be both understandable and reasonable given her age and circumstances.[FN4] At the time [*5]the petition was filed against Mr. F just a few months earlier in July, Ms. G was apparently taking adequate care of both children such that ACS did not file a petition against her then and agreed to the children's release to her.

The Court credits that Ms. G left the boys with their family members because she was trying to create a better life for them by focusing on earning money to provide her with some stability in supporting them. It is apparent that Ms. G did not feel she could manage working full-time while balancing the care of two very young children especially while living in a shelter where she could not control her location and without added support from her family, which she lacked at that time. The Court finds it significant that Ms. G exercised good judgment in the paternal family members she chose to leave the boys with and was correct to believe they would take good care of them. The Court credits that Ms. G provided a WIC card for Joshua and some necessities for Kanan through her mother. There is nothing wrong, or neglectful, with the mother's modifying the parenting time schedule with Kanan's father or relying on Joshua's grandparent at a time when she needed more coverage because of work, school or simply coping with the after-math of domestic violence. The concern here is that Ms. G did not clearly communicate her needs in making the arrangements with each caretaker and then did not maintain regular contact with the children, their caretakers, or the caseworker while she was not with them.

The Court does not believe that Ms. G's actions rose to the level of neglect within the meaning of Family Court Act section 1012. The Court credits that, at the time, Ms. G honestly believed her plan was in the best interests of her children as she was seeking to be able to financially provide for them when she resumed their care. The Court is also cognizant of Ms. G's young age and brain development in making this decision and the fact that she was in the throes of trying to extract herself from a relationship where this Court has now found that she was demeaned, controlled and physically abused. All of this impacted her thought process as well as her level of self-esteem and confidence. Given her years of victimization and the level of vulnerability that creates, it is entirely rational that Ms. G would feel the need to gain her bearings through a level of financial independence before she could care for her sons by herself, especially when she knew they had paternal relatives who lived in homes, rather than shelters, and who could provide greater stability. While one might disagree with her decision to leave the boys in others' care as long as she did without more regular contact, that choice does not fall below the minimum degree of care as required under the law. See Family Court Act § 1012(f)(i). Moreover, there has been no actual evidence presented here by ACS that the children were harmed as a result and or even in imminent danger of harm given that the relatives took good care of the children and the period involved was under two months. See Matter of Zahir W., 169 AD3d 909, 910 [2d Dept 2019] ("Although the mother failed to pick up the children from the aunt in the beginning of October 2016, as agreed, there was no evidence that the children were not being well-cared for by the aunt" and thus "ACS failed to establish that the mother neglected the children."); In re Kymani H., 152 AD3d 519, 520 [2d Dept 2017] (Neglect finding reversed where "the child voluntarily left the mother's home to live with two individuals who were not biologically related to the child, but who had assumed the roles of the child's father and [*6]grandmother since the child was 18 months old [and] [w]hile living with these individuals, the child's needs were met and the mother spoke with the child and his caretakers [several times] per week."); Matter of Justelle R., 60 Misc 3d 1211(A) [Fam Ct 2018] ("Sometimes adult children take advantage of their parents' open hearts and goodwill, knowing that their own children will be okay with the grandparents. Such behavior may be wrong in the moral sense, and it may even fall below the minimum standards of parenting under the law. However, if the children are not harmed as a result and not in imminent danger of harm, it is not neglect as defined by law."); see also In re Justin P., 148 AD3d 903, 904 [2d Dept 2017] (" The Family Court's finding that the child was neglected by the father's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying him with adequate food was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence [as] the father and the child were living with relatives during the relevant time period, and that the child was provided with meals by a family member when the father was working."); Matter of Jovann B., 153 AD2d 858, 859 [2d Dept 1989] (Reversing the Family Court's finding that the children were neglected due to the Respondents' failure to supply adequate food where the Petitioner's evidence demonstrated "the children's grandmother provided dinner for them almost every day."). "Actual or imminent danger of impairment is a 'prerequisite to a finding of neglect [which] ensures that the Family Court, in deciding whether to authorize state intervention, will focus on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just on what might be deemed undesirable parental behavior.'" Matter of Zahir W., 169 AD3d at 909-10 [2d Dept 2019]. There was no evidence of actual or imminent danger to the children as a result of Ms. G's actions or inactions in this case.

In the two and a half years this Court has come to know Ms. G through regular court appearances and her testimony in multiple hearings, this Court has been impressed by her intelligence, her sincerity and her manifested intention to improve herself and be a better mother to and provider for her children. She has matured in that time, which is shown by the fact that she has repaired her relationship with her mother who she has now been living with for more than six months since her newest child Julian was born. While this was not evidence at this hearing, the Court can take judicial notice of its orders and the reports received on Julian's case. The Court finds it is appropriate to take note of the progress Ms. G has made since Julian's birth as well as the challenges she continues to face in protecting herself from Mr. F. Ms. G may now be forced to leave her mother's home because of continued acts of domestic violence by Mr. F and repeated alleged violations of the order of protection.[FN5] The Court has ordered ACS to assist Ms. G in getting the police to take appropriate action to find and arrest Mr. F who has made himself absent from these court proceedings for months and to help Ms. G relocate to a domestic violence shelter if necessary. Meanwhile, Ms. G has been attending school regularly to obtain a certificate as a Patient Care Technician and has been caring for Julian without any physical concerns about his well-being. See ACS Court Report dated 9/2/21. In addition to the fact that the Court finds there is insufficient evidence for finding neglect, the Court does not believe a finding against Ms. G is in the best interest of the subject children or in the interests of justice given that Ms. G is herself a victim who has, at clear risk to herself, cooperated in testifying for [*7]ACS to obtain a finding against her abuser.[FN6]

Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent mother neglected the subject children and the petition will be dismissed with prejudice. In light of the fact that the petition against Mr. F is still pending disposition and it contains orders regarding Kanan (who is released to his father) and Joshua (who is placed with ACS to reside with his paternal grandmother), there will be no change to the subject children's legal statuses at this time except that, in light of this decision, the Court is denying final relief on ACS's long pending motion for restored over-night unsupervised time with both of these children.[FN7] The amount and schedule for that parenting time will be determined once Ms. G's current plan for remaining with her mother or entering a domestic violence shelter is clarified. The petition as to Julian is still pending pre-fact-finding as to both parents so his status is not impacted by this decision.

Footnote 1:Due to the closure of the courthouse to the public except for certain circumstances due to the Covid-19 pandemic, court proceedings have been, for the most part, entirely virtual since the end of March 2020.

Footnote 2:On November 14, 2019, this Court found after a hearing that there was insufficient proof of imminent risk that could not be ameliorated by court orders as required by Family Court Act § 1027. See Decision and Order after FCA § 1027 Hearing, dated November 14, 2019. Kanan was released to both of his parents pursuant to the pre-existing custody order, and Joshua was released to his mother with the condition that Ms. G enter PATH with both children that day with ACS assistance.

Footnote 3:In May of 2020, ACS filed an order to show cause to remove the children from Ms. G because she had left the shelter, returned to her mother's home, and allegedly allowed Mr. F into that home in violation of the order of protection. Because of on-going conflict with her mother, Ms. G left her home and was staying in low-cost hotels. Ms. G did not contest the removal at that time but continued to be permitted unsupervised visits with Kanan and Joshua. See Order on OTSC #1 dated May 21, 2020.

Footnote 4:On May 14, 2019, the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act ("DVSJA") was signed into law, amending Penal Law §60.12 by authorizing the imposition of alternative sentences for survivors of domestic violence, and enacting Criminal Procedure Law §440.47, providing a procedure by which these same survivors of domestic violence who are currently serving their sentences may apply to be resentenced. The legislation was born of the realization that "domestic violence and women's incarceration are inextricably linked" and that: "All too often, when a survivor defends herself or her children, our criminal justice system responds with harsh punishment instead of with compassion and assistance. Much of this punishment is the result of our state's current sentencing structure which does not allow judges discretion to fully consider the impact of domestic violence when determining sentence lengths. This leads to long, unfair prison sentences for many survivors." (NY Senate Assemb. Memorandum in Support of Bill A3110 [Jan. 26, 2017]). The DVSJA was intended to give the courts discretion to ameliorate the harsh effects of lengthy, mandatory sentences for victims of domestic violence where that violence was a significant contributing factor to their criminal behavior. In her recent decision applying this law to resentencing a defendant convicted of murder, Erie County Judge DiTullio references "numerous reports, including those by the United States Department of Justice, the Centers For Disease Control and the United States Department of Health & Human Services, as well as various law review and journal articles that detail the ravaging effects of domestic violence on its victims and the effects of that trauma on victims' thought processes and behaviors tremendous progress has been made with respect to our collective understanding of the impact domestic violence has on its victims and the way in which we view victims' conduct in the context of a criminal prosecution." People v Smith, 69 Misc 3d 1030, 1037-38 [NY Co Ct 2020]. While Article 10 proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature and are founded upon the need to protect children's well-being regardless of the reasons for a parent's behavior, this Court believes it is appropriate to consider when a mother's mental state and conduct have been impacted by intimate partner violence especially where, as here, the evidence of any harm to the children is speculative at best.

Footnote 5:Pending before this Court is a motion by ACS requesting that this Court hold Mr. F in criminal contempt for violating this Court's order of protection. See Order to Show Cause, NN-30151-2/19, NN-20753-4/19, NN-07634-20, filed December 15, 2021.

Footnote 6: In its decision in Nicholson v Scopetta, the Court of Appeals considered the difficult issue of assessing the responsibility of a Respondent mother in a neglect case who is a domestic violence victim: "[F]or a battered mother- and ultimately for a court - what course of action constitutes a parent's exercise of a 'minimum degree of care' may include such considerations as: risks attendant to leaving, if the batterer has threatened to kill her if she does; risks attendant to staying and suffering continued abuse; risks attendant to seeking assistance through government channels, potentially increasing the danger to herself and her children; risks attendant to criminal prosecution against the abuser; and risks attendant to relocation. Whether a particular mother in these circumstances has actually failed to exercise a minimum degree of care is necessarily dependent on facts such as the severity and frequency of the violence, and the resources and options available to her." 3 NY3d 357, 371 [2004]. In a related footnote, the Court states, "The Legislature has recognized this 'quandary' that a victim of domestic violence encounters. To avoid punitive responses from child protective services agencies, the Legislature attempted to increase awareness of child protective agencies of the dynamics of domestic violence and its impact on child protection by amending the Social Services Law to mandate comprehensive domestic violence training for child protective services workers." Id. at n.6 (citing Senate Mem. in Support, 2002 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1861).

Footnote 7:ACS filed a motion seeking to end the mother's unsupervised visits in April 2021 based on an altercation between Mr. O and the mother at an exchange of Kanan where the parents made cross-allegations, but ACS laid the blame on Ms. G. The Court initially granted interim relief making the visits supervised by approved resources but later restored Ms. G's unsupervised day visits. See Order on OTSC #2/3 dated September 20, 2021."

SEEKING RELIEF IN SUPREME COURT - RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ISSUES

This was a NYC case.

Friedman Residence LLC v. Denson, Date filed: 2021-03-29, Court: Supreme Court, New York, Judge: Justice Paul Goetz, Case Number: 159576/20:

"Residential landlord-tenant issues such as use and occupancy and who is entitled to possession are typically resolved in Housing Court. Indeed, Housing Court is the strongly preferred forum for resolving landlord-tenant disputes (Brecker v. 295 Central Park West, Inc., 71 AD3d 564, 565 [1st Dept 2010]; Langotsky v. 537 Greenwich LLC, 45 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2007]; Solovieff Gallery Co. v. Langston, 167 AD2d 325 [1st Dept 1990]), “particularly where complete relief is available in that court” (L.B. v. Stahl York Ave. Co., 188 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2020]) and there are “no special circumstances or novel issues requiring Supreme Court involvement” (Brecker, 71 AD3d at 565).

When there are simultaneous cases pending in Supreme Court and Housing Court, it is not an abuse of discretion for Supreme Court to stay the case before it pending resolution of the Housing Court proceeding (Langotsky, 45 AD3d at 405).

The principle that Housing Court is the preferred forum for resolution of residential landlord-tenant issues is further strengthened by the passage of the Provision of Legal Services in Eviction Proceedings law in 2017 (26 NYC Adm Code, Chapter 13) also known as the Universal Access to Counsel law in Housing Court (UAC). The UAC establishes a phased-in program to provide legal assistance and representation to income eligible tenants (those tenants with household incomes not in excess of 200 percent of the federal poverty guidelines). The program the UAC establishes seeks to right the imbalance of power between unrepresented tenants and represented landlords in Housing Court (see generally 2247 Webser Ave. JDFC v. Galarce, 62 Misc 3d 1036 (Bx Civ Ct 2019] [discussing various studies concluding that increasing access to legal representation to tenants in Housing Court should be an imperative and some positive signs in that direction since the passage of the UAC]). However, the program established by the UAC is not available to tenants who are sued in Supreme Court ejectment actions because the UAC only applies to summary proceedings in housing court (or administrative proceeding brought by the New York city Housing Authority for termination of a tenancy) (26 NYC Adm Code §26 1301). Consequently allowing, ejectment actions such as this one where there is no imperative to seeking removal of the tenant1 would subvert the intent of the UAC by increasing the number of unrepresented tenants albeit in a new forum, Supreme Court and the principle that Housing Court is the strongly preferred forum for resolving landlord-tenant disputes.

Therefore, the appropriate forum for this case is Housing Court and that branch of plaintiff’s order to show cause seeking use and occupancy will be denied without prejudice to seeking such amounts in Housing Court. In addition, this action will be stayed for plaintiff to bring a proceeding against defendant in Housing Court and for resolution of that proceeding (CPLR §2201). Plaintiff can seek the remaining primary relief it seeks in Housing Court i.e. possession of the unit occupied by defendant and use and occupancy (NYC Civ Ct Act §110). To the extent plaintiff seeks a money judgment for alleged property damage caused by a sink overflowing and the installation of a chain lock (NYSCEF Doc 150), relief Housing Court is not empowered to grant, once the Housing Court proceeding is resolved (NYC Civ Ct Act §110), plaintiff may move to vacate the stay and restore this case to active status."

MEDIATION & ARBITRATION

 

A MASSACHUSETTS CRA CASE

MILLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS v. MP, 478 Mass. 767 - Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2018:

"Child Requiring Assistance. Statute, Construction. Words, "Wilfully."

This court concluded that under the habitual truancy provision of the children requiring assistance statute, G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 39E-39I, a child wilfully fails to attend school when he or she acts purposefully, such that his or her behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior [775-784]; therefore, this court vacated the judgment of a Juvenile Court judge that a child required assistance based on a finding that the child had wilfully failed to attend school, where nothing in the record suggested that the child's behavior exhibited problems or tendencies that could lead toward juvenile delinquency, and where nothing in the record showed that a modification of the child's custody arrangements would help improve the child's attendance record [784-785].

LENK, J.

The children requiring assistance (CRA) statute, G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 39E-39I, confers jurisdiction upon the Juvenile Court to intervene in the custody arrangements of children who are, inter alia, "habitually truant," meaning that they "willfully fail[] to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a quarter." G. L. c. 119, § 21. The statute is aimed at children who exhibit "misbehavior which is not violative of any criminal statute, but which is the cause for concern that it is indicative of problems or tendencies that may eventually lead to delinquent or criminal activity." R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 (2d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2017) (Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law). In such cases, the Juvenile Court is tasked with examining the 768*768 children's circumstances and determining whether changing or placing conditions on their custody arrangements will help deter their potentially harmful behaviors. Id. The party that initiates a CRA proceeding must prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

In this case, we decide whether a child, M.P., who has failed continually to attend school due to a combination of physical and mental disabilities, including a severe bladder condition and autism, was properly adjudicated as a child requiring assistance on the basis of a habitual truancy CRA petition filed by the Millis public schools (school district).^[2] To make this determination, we must address the novel question of what it means for a child to "willfully fail[] to attend school." In light of the CRA statute's goal of deterring delinquency, the statutory requirement that a child's failure to attend school be wilful reflects legislative concern as to why the child is regularly skipping school: it contemplates purposeful conduct by the child. The wilfulness requirement thus necessitates judicial inquiry into and assessment of the child's reasons for not attending school. When the child's repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute. Using the definition we set forth today, the evidence in the record does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend school."

1. Background. a. Statutory scheme. The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over three primary areas: delinquency and youthful offender cases, care and protection matters, and CRA proceedings. G. L. c. 119, §§ 26, 39E, 54. Children in CRA proceedings often are said to have committed "status offenses," because the statute is "couched in terms of the child's condition rather than in terms of the commission of specific acts" (citation omitted). See Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law, supra at § 4.1. Unlike children who are adjudicated delinquent, children requiring assistance have not committed wrongdoing against another or against society but, rather, are deemed to be acting against their own interests. See id.

The CRA statute defines a child requiring assistance as one who is between the ages of six and eighteen and who "(i) repeatedly runs away from the home of the child's parent, legal guardian or custodian; (ii) repeatedly fails to obey the lawful and 769*769 reasonable commands of the child's parent, legal guardian or custodian, thereby interfering with their ability to adequately care for and protect the child; (iii) repeatedly fails to obey the lawful and reasonable regulations of the child's school; (iv) is habitually truant; or (v) is a sexually exploited child." G. L. c. 119, § 21. As relevant here, the CRA statute defines one who is "[h]abitually truant" as "a school-aged child, not excused from attendance under the lawful and reasonable regulations of such child's school, who willfully fails to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a quarter." Id.

CRA proceedings are initiated when a parent, legal guardian, custodian, or school district files an application in the Juvenile Court for issuance of a petition that seeks a determination that the child requires assistance. G. L. c. 119, § 39E. Upon this filing, the court issues a summons requiring the child and his or her parents or guardian to appear before it. Id. A Juvenile Court judge then conducts a preliminary hearing to determine whether the petition should issue.^[3] Id. At this hearing, the judge may decline to accept the application because there is "no probable cause to believe that the child and family are in need of assistance," or because "the interests of the child would best be served by informal assistance, in which case the [judge] shall, with the consent of the child and the child's parents or guardian, refer the child to a probation officer for assistance." Id. Alternatively, a judge may accept the application and schedule a fact-finding hearing. Id. In order for a judge ultimately to find that the child requires assistance, the petitioner must prove the allegations of the petition beyond a reasonable doubt. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

Only after a child is proved habitually truant beyond a reasonable doubt should the judge contemplate changes to the child's custody arrangements. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. The judge, "taking into consideration the physical and emotional welfare of the child, may make any of the following orders of disposition": (1) permit the child to stay with the parents, custodians, or guardians, subject to conditions and limitations that the court may choose;^[4] (2) place the child in the care of a relative, probation officer, other 770*770 qualified adult, private charitable or childcare agency, or other authorized or qualified private organization, subject to conditions and limitations; or (3) place the child in the custody of the Department of Children and Families. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. The disposition is not a direct order requiring the child to comply with the conditions, however, and the judge may not impose penalties for criminal contempt for the child's failure to comply.^[5] See Commonwealth v. Florence F., 429 Mass. 523, 524-525 (1999).

b. Factual background. We summarize the Juvenile Court judge's findings of fact concerning M.P., supplemented with certain uncontested facts in the record. See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 529 (2015).

i. Medical conditions. M.P. is a fifteen year old girl who has been diagnosed with significant detrusor sphincter discoordination (bladder condition), autism spectrum disorder (autism), anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).^[6] Her bladder condition is such that she has difficulty voiding, and when she does so, she usually "leaves behind a large volume of urine." As a result, she needs to use the restroom frequently, often for hours at a time. This condition makes her predisposed to urinary tract infections. She also has an abnormally large bladder. M.P. has experienced this condition since the age of six, when she underwent a surgical procedure for her urinary tract.^[7]

M.P.'s bladder condition is compounded by her numerous cognitive and emotional disorders. In kindergarten she was diagnosed with "pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified"; this nomenclature is now subsumed under the diagnosis of autism. In December, 2016, a child neurologist confirmed 771*771 that M.P. meets the criteria for autism.^[8]

The child neurologist further opined that M.P. exhibits many symptoms of OCD and has a "number of difficulties processing sensory information — she does not like to change her clothes and some sounds are really bothersome." Relatedly, a developmental pediatrician noted that M.P.'s autism and OCD cause her to fixate on "obsessive rituals and rigidities that control every aspect of her daily life." M.P. feels that she cannot leave the house until her bladder is completely empty, which typically takes hours. If she hears noises while she is in the restroom, she has to begin her process of voiding from the beginning. She has difficulty tolerating busy and unpredictable settings and cannot use public restrooms. At one point, in order to obtain a medical evaluation, her family had to rent a nearby hotel room so that M.P. could have a "safe and comfortable place to use the bathroom." Her anxiety regarding her bladder condition is so great that she sleeps on a couch close to the bathroom, rather than in her own bed. She also often will hold her urine until her parents go to sleep.

M.P. also has aversions to many practices for ordinary hygiene. She refuses to use feminine hygiene products or wear appropriate seasonal clothing. She will not shower at home and has only taken two showers in the past year, choosing instead to clean herself with body wipes that in turn cause skin irritation. She previously has been sent home from school for offensive body odor. M.P. has almost no social or peer contact outside her family.

In February, 2017, the developmental pediatrician concluded that M.P.'s anxiety and OCD were associated with PTSD. She opined that M.P. has medical necessity for direct one-to-one "home based, behavioral therapy services utilizing Applied Behavioral Analysis to target functional communication, social pragmatics and other skills in order to generalize skills across environments from the school to the home and general community." In addition, the pediatrician observed that the CRA proceeding, 772*772 as described below, had "further impact[ed] [M.P.'s] wellbeing with escalating anxiety and sadness and resultant worsening of her emotional fragility and function." She reported that M.P. was "not sleeping and [was] filled with anxiety regarding the outcome of [the] case," and urged that the CRA case "be dropped at once out of medical necessity."

ii. School attendance. M.P. initially was enrolled in an online high school, but her parents decided to place her in the Millis public school system for the 2016-2017 school year in order to obtain special education services.^[9] She did not attend classes from the first day of school on August 31, 2016, through October 20, 2016. At the start of the school year, the school district conducted an evaluation and the special education team recommended that M.P. attend an extended forty-five day evaluation in a therapeutic setting, because the school district did not believe it could provide the services that M.P. required. The school district enrolled her in the ACCEPT Collaborative Therapeutic program from October 21, 2016, until January 6, 2017, which provided her with a shortened school day. Under this program, M.P. attended only nine shortened school days, for a total of 10.5 hours of learning time.

The school district then arranged for home-based services for M.P. through a private provider, beginning on December 27, 2016. A service provider began meeting with M.P. at her house from 9 A.M. until 11 A.M., Monday through Thursday, to help her prepare to leave the house. The provider arranged for tutoring at home, and then helped her transition to tutoring at the library; M.P. demonstrated increased ability to leave the house and was making "great strides." Notably, after a few weeks, the provider changed the meeting time to 12 P.M., to accommodate both the schedule of the library and the tutor. The provider explained that when M.P. had a clear understanding of what was expected of her, she was successful in leaving the house with him. Occasionally, however, M.P. continued to be unable to leave the bathroom for long periods of time. Additionally, of the thirty sessions scheduled between December 27, 2016, and February 21, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled eight times (once for a holiday and once for an appointment, but otherwise for reasons that are not known) and the home-based service provider canceled four times (three times 773*773 due to weather conditions, and one time for reasons unknown). M.P. was able to attend 55.5 per cent of the scheduled tutoring sessions, for a total of 33.5 hours.

On March 13, 2017, M.P. was enrolled in Keough Memorial Academy (Keough Memorial), a special education day school designed for children with emotional disabilities, and was to begin classes on March 29 of that year. Keough Memorial educators were aware of M.P.'s disabilities and were confident that they could meet her needs. M.P. was to continue with the home-based service provider while attending Keough Memorial, and the school district made an exception to permit the provider to meet M.P. on weekends, not just on school days, to help her maintain a routine. The provider then attempted to change his appointments with M.P. back to 9 A.M., so that she could be ready in time for the Keough Memorial school day. After this change, the family canceled the home-based provider sessions more frequently; of the twenty-four appointments scheduled between February 22 and May 2, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled twelve (once for an illness and once for an appointment, but otherwise for unknown reasons), and the home-based provider canceled three (once due to weather conditions, once because of M.P.'s health, and once because of "unclear ... expectations").

Between April 5 and April 28, 2017, the home-based provider did not schedule any appointments because the provider wanted to meet M.P. in the morning, but the family wanted him to come in the afternoon. The provider testified, however, that M.P. never said that she did not want to go to school; to the contrary, M.P. communicated to him that she did want to attend. By May 1, 2017, M.P. had attended only eight shortened days at Keough Memorial, for a total of 7.9 learning hours. She typically arrived near the end of the school day.

As of April 20, 2017, M.P. also became eligible for services with the Department of Developmental Services. That month, the family arranged to have an applied behavior analyst from an independent organization provide an initial assessment of M.P. In his initial report, the analyst noted that her behavior "poses a serious risk to the health and wellbeing of herself and her family," and that her behaviors and anxieties had persisted and intensified despite her parents' provision of several accommodations and modifications. The analyst stated that M.P.'s "challenging behavior" arose from pain and discomfort due to complications regarding her bladder retention, which was an "automatic" or "internal" function.

774*774 As of the time of the fact-finding hearing, the analyst had met with M.P. only a few times, but he stated that an applied behavior analysis therapist would soon work with M.P. for eighteen hours per week. He anticipated that M.P. would need treatment for from six months to one year. He also explained that M.P. conveyed on "many occasions" that "she's very excited" to start the program and loves school; she had been crying daily because of her inability to attend school.

iii. CRA proceedings. On November 30, 2016, just a few months after M.P.'s initial enrollment in the Millis public schools, the school district filed a CRA petition, alleging that M.P. was a child requiring assistance on the grounds that she was habitually truant. A Juvenile Court judge held a preliminary hearing on December 14, 2016, and accepted the petition.^[10] The judge then scheduled a fact-finding hearing for January 19, 2017, which was continued twice. A two-day fact-finding hearing took place on May 4 and 26, 2017.

At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the judge found that M.P. was habitually truant and adjudicated her a child requiring assistance. The judge noted that, under the CRA statute, a child's failure to attend school must be wilful, which the judge defined as "acting intentionally, as opposed to accidentally or involuntarily." She concluded that "[a]lthough ... [M.P.'s] actions of failing to attend school have been attributed to her medical conditions and emotional challenges, they are still actions taken by the child not to attend school." The judge noted that none of M.P.'s assessments indicated that she "was either home bound or unable to benefit from an education," and that there was no evidence indicating that M.P. should be exempt from school.

The judge further found that M.P.'s parents "are now working hard to obtain additional therapeutic services for their daughter so that she can attend school." She stated that "[m]any of the therapeutic services assessed by the parents were pursued after the commencement of this CRA petition, while the home based therapeutic services offered by the school were not consistently utilized by the child or the parents." Ultimately, however, the judge decided that M.P. "appears to be receiving appropriate services and no further services need be ordered at this time," and 775*775 did not alter M.P.'s custody arrangements. Nonetheless, the judge stated that later dispositional review would be necessary to determine whether the newly implemented services, meaning the sessions with the applied behavior analyst, were sufficient. The judge also excused M.P. from attending future hearings, noting that her time would be better spent in school, rather than in the CRA hearings, which "increase[d] her stress."

M.P. appealed from the CRA determination to a single justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39I. The single justice referred the case to a full panel of the Appeals Court. We then transferred the case to this court on our own motion. The school district did not participate in the appeal.

2. Discussion. There is no dispute that M.P. missed more than eight days of school in each quarter of the 2016-2017 school year, and that most of her absences were not excused "under the lawful and reasonable regulations of such child's school."^[11] See G. L. c. 119, § 21. The question before us is whether she "willfully fail[ed] to attend school." Id. This court has not previously examined the meaning of this language. We conclude that the CRA statute's habitual truancy provision requires purposeful conduct by the child. When the child's repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute.

a. Plain meaning. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564-565 (2010). In order to determine what it means to "willfully fail[] to attend school," we turn first to the plain meaning of the statutory language. "Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given its `ordinary meaning.'" Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013). The plain meaning of a statute "must be reasonable and supported by the purpose and history of the statute." Id., quoting Wright v. Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996).

We look initially "to dictionary definitions as a guide to a term's plain or ordinary meaning." Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017). One dictionary defines "willful" as "done deliberately" or "intentional," and "not accidental or without purpose." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2617 (1993). According to Black's Law Dictionary, "willful" means 776*776 "[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious." Black's Law Dictionary 1834 (10th ed. 2014). Black's Law Dictionary further states, however, that a "voluntary act becomes willful in law, only when it involves conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, whether the act is right or wrong." Id. Thus, some definitions focus on the actor's purpose, while others focus only on whether the actor's conduct was voluntary or intentional.

Nor does wilfulness have a consistent meaning in our jurisprudence. In the adoption context, we have explained that, while wilfulness implies intentional conduct, it does not require ill will. See Adoption of a Minor, 343 Mass. 292, 297 (1961) (statute permitting adoption without consent of parent where parent wilfully deserts or neglects child "does not require that the neglect to provide be done with malevolence or ill will; it is enough if the conduct resulting in the failure to provide was not unintentional"). In criminal cases, on the other hand, we have held that conduct is wilful "when the actor intends both the conduct and its harmful consequences." Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 443 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352 (1990). See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 242 (2012). Nonetheless, "in only a few select areas of law does `willfully' require a showing of an intent to violate a known legal duty." Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 466 Mass. 454, 456, 464 n.12 (2013) (rejecting argument that wilfulness, as used in G. L. c. 21A, § 16 [administrative penalties act], requires knowledge that "conduct will or may constitute a violation of applicable environmental standards," and instead holding that wilfulness only requires that "party who has not complied with the law knew or should have known of the operative facts that made their acts unlawful").

The question remains, then, whether wilfulness under the CRA statute's habitual truancy provision implies merely voluntary or intentional conduct, or also necessitates inquiry into a student's purpose in missing school.

b. Legislative history. As the term "willfully" may have several meanings when read in isolation, we turn to the broader statutory context and legislative history of the CRA statute to ascertain the intended meaning. See Franklin Office Park Realty Corp., 466 Mass. at 463 ("Although `willful' may have several meanings when read in isolation, its meaning in any particular statute may 777*777 be determined from examining the act itself as well as the larger statutory scheme").

The habitual truancy provision dates back to 1873, when the Legislature enacted a statute requiring each city and town in Massachusetts to impose criminal penalties for "habitual truants." See St. 1873, c. 262 § 3 ("An Act concerning truant children and absentees from school"). The legislation was enacted in response to a report from the Board of Education, which had collected numerous school committee reports complaining of a lack of proper enforcement mechanisms to address widespread truancy.^[12] See id.; Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Education, Abstracts of School Committee Reports (Jan. 1873).

A century later, Governor Francis W. Sargent and others recognized that to send habitual truants and other status offenders "away from their homes to an institution which deprives them of their liberty and individuality and, at times, inflicts physical punishment and harassment, is to blame the victims of society's neglect and to hinder their eventual rehabilitation." See F.W. 778*778 Sargent, Letter to the Senate and House of Representatives (Nov. 20, 1972), 1973 House Doc. No. 5593. As then Governor Sargent explained, "we now know that there is an alternative to institutionalization — community based treatment. It is better for the child and better for the taxpayers." Id.

Thus, the Legislature enacted the children in need of services (CHINS) statute, the predecessor of the CRA statute, in 1973. The CHINS statute decriminalized status offenses such as truancy by removing them from the delinquency jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court and tasking Juvenile Court judges with providing "nonpunitive care to address the problem of certain children." See Florence F., 429 Mass. at 527, citing St. 1973, c. 1073; Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.2. Notably, the CHINS statute defined a "child in need of services" on the grounds of truancy in almost the same language as does the current CRA statute: as a child who is "between the ages of six and sixteen who persistently and wilfully fails to attend school." See 1973 Senate Doc. No. 1922; 1973 House J. 3941. The statute's inclusion of habitual truants is consistent with the Legislature's recognition that education is vital to a child's progress. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 335 (1987) ("[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment" [citation omitted]).

CHINS proceedings were intended to target children who "fall between the chairs, so to speak. They are not the dependent children who are clearly entitled to the full protection of the [J]uvenile [C]ourt. Neither are they law breakers entitled to whatever firm or lenient treatment the law or individual judge feels appropriate for such offenders." Florence F., 429 Mass. at 528, quoting In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 869 (1977). The goals of the CHINS statute were "(a) preventing delinquency involvement; (b) fostering the pursuit of education; and (c) providing support to families during periods of emotional turbulence." Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law, supra at § 4.5. See id. at § 4.1 ("the court's approach is that through the provision of certain rehabilitative or preventive services ... the child will be diverted from the tendency to engage in future delinquent behavior").

779*779 The CHINS statute was significantly amended in 2012, when it was reformulated as the CRA statute, but the overarching purpose of the statute did not change. The 2012 amendments were enacted in response to the Legislature's recognition of the CHINS statute's failure to "[keep] children out of the juvenile justice system as the [L]egislature intended." See Press Release, Governor Patrick Signs Legislation to Reform Children in Need of Services System (Aug. 7, 2012). The amendments sought to achieve this goal by making proceedings less adversarial, and to "divert cases from the courts into a system of community-based service providers."^[13] Senate OK's Changes on Runaways, Truants, State House News Service, July 15, 2011. The CRA statute treats involvement of the Juvenile Court system as something of a last resort. See G. L. c. 119, § 39E (before CRA petition is filed, "the clerk shall inform the petitioner that the petitioner may delay filing the request and choose to have the child and the child's family referred to a family resource center, community-based services program or other ... community-based services in the [J]uvenile [C]ourt district where the child resides and return to court at a later time to file an application for assistance, if needed"; clerk also is required to "prepare, publish and disseminate to each petitioner educational material relative to available family resource centers, community-based services programs and other entities designated by the [S]ecretary of [H]ealth and [H]uman services").

Proponents of the CRA statute reasoned that "the current studies suggest[ed] that children ... who are regularly exposed to the courts are more likely to be involved in serious crimes later in life." Senate OK's Changes on Runaways, Truants, supra. See Lawmakers, Advocates Urge Overhaul of Child Services System, State House News Service, Mar. 30, 2011 ("Arguing that the [S]tate's [thirty-eight year old] system of services for troubled 780*780 children forces them into the court system prematurely and can tear families apart, lawmakers and advocacy groups called yesterday for an overhaul of the system"); State House Rally Calls for Children's Services Reform, MetroWest Daily News, June 28, 2012; Politicians Push for New Way to Deal with Troubled Kids, MetroWest Daily News, Mar. 30, 2011 (Reis) ("Advocates, parents and graduates of Children in Need of Service argue early court involvement can push adolescents into a life of crime"). Although CRA determinations are not entered on children's juvenile records, see G. L. c. 119, § 39E, proponents noted that the mere fact of children's involvement with the Juvenile Court stigmatizes them and makes them "more likely to be involved in serious crimes later in life." See State Capitol Briefs, State House News Service, July 14, 2011. See, e.g., Lawmakers Push New System to Serve Troubled Kids, State House News Service, Oct. 6, 2009; Politicians Push for New Way to Deal with Troubled Kids, supra.

As Senator Karen Spilka, the lead Senate sponsor of the CRA bill, explained:

"[The CHINS statute] began with good intentions. Its goal was to prevent children from entering the juvenile justice system. But the irony of this is that the court system was telling parents and families to go to this system, so we were sending messages that didn't make sense. We heard time and time again after many meetings that parents and children should not have to go to court to get services. The second thing we were hearing was focusing on the children's behavior, and this was an adversarial system. This was not bad for all families but it tore a lot of them apart.... The third thing was that each community needs to have services available for children[] and families; this is faster, easier, and resolves issues more quickly.... This bill removes labels from children and removes stigma from them .... [T]hat is a wonderful thing."

2011 House Doc. No. 3492, Senate Floor Debate, July 12, 2011.

Therefore, as with the CHINS statute, the purpose of the CRA statute is to "address the root causes of juvenile delinquency." State House Rally Calls for Children's Services Reform, supra. The legislative history and statutory scheme as a whole demonstrate that in order to determine whether a child has "willfully 781*781 fail[ed] to attend school," a Juvenile Court judge must examine the child's purpose or reasons for being absent, so that the judge can decide whether the student's behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior.

c. Authority in other jurisdictions. Nearly every State has a statute authorizing courts or law enforcement officers to intervene in the custody arrangements of children who are in need of services or supervision because, inter alia, they have run away from home, are truant, are beyond the control of their parents or guardians, or otherwise are jeopardizing their own welfare or that of others.^[14] Although most of these statutes include provisions on truancy,^[15] only Massachusetts and five other States (Michigan, 782*782 Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) have statutory language that expressly includes a wilfulness component in the truancy provision.^[16]

Notwithstanding the absence of a wilfulness component in their comparable statutes, Minnesota and New York have, in turn, interpreted their truancy provisions to require purposeful conduct. See Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., 451 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Minn. App. 1990); Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 380-381 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995). For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that under its "child in need of protection or 783*783 services" framework, "[t]ruancy implies volitional conduct on the part of the child for which the child is responsible." Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., supra. Thus, a "child who is absent from school in obedience to a parent's wrongful command should not be stigmatized or confused by an unwarranted truancy label."^[17] Id. By inquiring whether the child is responsible for his or her own conduct, and not simply whether the child is acting intentionally, Minnesota's instructive approach seeks to ascertain the underlying reason for the child's absences.

d. Wilfulness under the CRA statute. In order to effectuate the Legislature's goals, the phrase "willfully fails to attend school," as used in the CRA statute's habitual truancy provision, must require more than voluntary or intentional conduct. The primary concern of the truancy provision is to target children who are, for instance, "playing hooky" or beyond their parents' control. Cf. Matter of the Welfare of L.Z., C.R.P., & S.L.P., 396 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Minn. 1986) ("The classic case of truancy is the child sent to school by his parents, who then skips"). We conclude that a child "willfully fails to attend school" when he or she acts purposefully, such that his or her behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior.^[18] Ascertaining the child's purpose in failing repeatedly to attend school allows the court to focus on whether the behavior is such that it can and should be deterred, and on whether the child's home circumstances are such that the court should change, or place conditions on, the child's custody arrangements. See G. L. c. 119, § 39G (choices available to Juvenile Court judge in CRA proceedings concern only custody, and provision of services may be merely conditions of 784*784 custody). See also Oscar F. v. County of Worcester, 412 Mass. 38, 41 (1992) (statute "is concerned with social and family problems. It does not make the kind of education that a child receives a central judicial concern").

We emphasize that a finding of wilfulness is a fact-based inquiry that will depend on the circumstances of each case. Not every case involving a mental or physical disability necessarily will shield a child from a finding of wilfulness, since not every disability affects a child's ability to attend school. Each child's purpose or reasons for missing school should be examined individually in order to determine whether the absences are wilful beyond a reasonable doubt. Given their experience with juveniles and with delinquency matters, Juvenile Court judges are uniquely situated to assess whether the child's reasons for regularly missing school are of the concerning nature that would portend delinquency and call for deterrence.

e. Application to M.P. With this definition in mind, the evidence in the record does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend school." Even assuming that the judge correctly determined that M.P.'s acts of staying home were voluntary or intentional, it is uncontested that her purpose was to address her bladder condition and associated mental and emotional impairments. While M.P. was not "home bound" per se, nor exempt from school, nothing of record suggests that M.P.'s behavior exhibited problems or tendencies that could lead toward juvenile delinquency. To the contrary, the Juvenile Court judge acknowledged that M.P. desired to go to school, and it is undisputed that M.P. was saddened by her inability to do so. Even during the short period when she established a routine with the in-home service provider, M.P.'s bladder condition still interfered with her ability to leave the house.

Nor do the judge's findings and the record show that a modification of her custody arrangements would help improve M.P.'s attendance record.^[19] Cf. Matter of Benjamin A., 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 52217, at n.14 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oswego County Sept. 26, 785*785 2011) (unreported) ("Even if the Court could find otherwise, a [person in need of services] label is not going to get Benjamin to school. All the services he needs to be successful are available to him through the school district and diversion services. If those services do not ... work and Benjamin does not attend school, what could this Court do but remove[] him from his family and place him into an ill-prepared and overworked juvenile justice system").

We note that an incorrect CRA adjudication is not without consequences. Even where, as here, there is no change in custody, such a finding can be harmful in at least two respects. First, CRA proceedings could affect parents' custodial rights in the future; courts have considered such proceedings in care and protection cases when terminating parental custody. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Sam, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2015); Adoption of Odessa, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2010). Second, as discussed, the CRA statute was amended specifically to minimize children's exposure to the Juvenile Court unless court involvement is necessary, in order to prevent the stigma and other negative consequences of premature court involvement. In this case, the evidence showed that the CRA proceedings worsened M.P.'s condition and increased her anxiety, stress, and sadness.^[20]

The evidence of record does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend school." Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for entry of an order dismissing the CRA petition.

So ordered.

[1] The mother and father of M.P.

[2] Millis public schools did not participate in this appeal.

[3] Both the child and the parents or legal guardians have a right to counsel at all stages of CRA proceedings. G. L. c. 119, § 39F.

[4] These conditions include "provision for medical, psychological, psychiatric, educational, occupational, and social services, and for supervision by a court clinic or by any public or private organization providing counseling or guidance services." G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

[5] The order of disposition is effective for 120 days, and may be extended for three additional periods of up to ninety days each. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. After that, a new hearing is required. See Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 493-494 (2008). The disposition is no longer effective after the child's eighteenth birthday. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

[6] The Juvenile Court judge's findings of fact omitted M.P.'s diagnoses of anxiety disorder, OCD, and PTSD. These diagnoses, however, were contained in both doctors' letters and in service providers' notes, the same medical records upon which the judge relied without qualification.

[7] In May, 2017, one of M.P.'s doctors prescribed a new bladder relaxation medication in the hopes of improving her condition. The fact-finding hearing in this case took place in the same month that this medication was prescribed; accordingly, the record is silent as to the effectiveness of this medication.

[8] The judge noted that, while the child neurologist shared her opinions in writing with M.P.'s school district in February, 2017, "no neurological testing results, evaluation information, data, or the like were shared with the school. It is unclear whether any such neurological testing, evaluation, etc. actually was conducted. [The child neurologist] provided her opinion based on her review of the literature ... [and M.P.'s] medical and educational history combined with her one appointment with the child [in December, 2016]." The judge did not, however, express any doubt as to whether M.P. has autism, nor does the record suggest any reason to doubt this diagnosis.

[9] Although the school district initially enrolled M.P. as a ninth grader for the 2016-2017 school year, later that year she was offered enrollment at Keough Memorial Academy, a special education day school, as an eighth grader.

[10] The record does not provide the basis for the judge's decision to accept the CRA petition.

[11] M.P. does not challenge the lawfulness or reasonableness of her school's regulations regarding truancy.

[12] For example, the school committee of Barnstable noted that four-fifths of the crimes in New England were committed by those who had not been educated, and "[o]f juvenile offenders, ninety-five hundredths [were] from ignorant and idle homes, and a large number of them were truants from school at the time of arrest." Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Education, Abstracts of School Committee Reports, at 3 (Jan. 1873). Peabody's committee stated that the practice of sending truant children to almshouses had done little to combat the growing problem of truancy, and called for "habitual truants" to face criminal sentences. Id. at 89-90. Salem's committee touted its then recently enacted ordinance criminalizing truancy as a means of deterrence. Id. at 94. Cambridge's committee, in turn, attributed the majority of its truancy cases to the "indifference, neglect or parsimony of parents," and stated that "reformatory institutions" were better than almshouses for addressing truancy. Id. at 121-122. Malden's superintendent of public schools stated that truant children required greater attention because other pupils "[were] led to imitate their bad practices, and thus the evil [had] increased to no small magnitude." Id. at 139. Wakefield's school committee stated that "[i]gnorant boys [could] be seen every day in [the town's] streets with nothing but mischief to occupy their time. Their parents [were] too indifferent to their welfare, or too imbecile to send them to school," and called for "strict enforcement" of compulsory education. Id. at 147. Clinton's committee chairman also called for trial judges to handle cases of truancy, noting that its local truancy officer was ill-equipped to address the problem. Id. at 202-203. Westborough's school committee chairman attributed the problem of truancy to the indifference of parents who were often "ignorant" themselves and advocated for a "board of truant officers." Id. at 219. Worcester's truant school committee also noted that its truant officer was overburdened and that the children who were "not sent to school at all" were those whom it considered the "children most sinned against." Id. at 230.

[13] The amendments provided for the establishment of a system of community-based resources and assistance to families to coordinate screenings, assessments, and referrals, and required school districts to establish truancy prevention programs for habitually truant students before referring them to the Juvenile Court. See R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 (Supp. 2017). The revisions also made CRA proceedings confidential; adjusted the adjudication procedures by, inter alia, removing the provisions for a jury trial; and provided that, where a child was in need of assistance, he or she no longer could be placed with the Department of Youth Services or shackled and restrained in a delinquent juvenile facility, but could be placed with the Department of Children and Families. See id.

[14] See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 12-15-201(4), 12-15-215; Alaska Stat. §§ 47.10.011, 47.10.142(e); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-201(19), 8-341(A)(2), 15-803(B); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-303(24), 9-27-322; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-120(5), 46b-149; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 921(6)(b); D.C. Code §§ 16-2301(8), 16-2320(c); Fla. Stat. §§ 984.03(9), 984.22(2); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-11-2(11), 15-11-381, 15-11-442; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(B)-(D); Idaho Code Ann. § 20-505; 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405 / §§ 3-3, 3-24, 3-33.5; Ind. Code §§ 31-34-1-6, 31-34-20-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-2022(d), 38-2253; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 159.150, 630.020, 630.120; La. Child. Code Ann. arts. 728, 730, 779; 15 Me. Rev. Stat. § 3501; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e), 3-8A-19; Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.007(6), 260C.201; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-105(k), 43-21-607; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 41-5-103(22), (51), 41-5-1512; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 169-D:2(II), 169-D:17; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4A-83, 2A:4A-89; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-3B-2, 32A-3B-16; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 712(a), 754; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27), 7B-2503; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-20-02(19), 27-20-32; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.022, 2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718) (enacted 2017); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.100; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6302 ("[d]ependent child"), 6351; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(9), 14-1-32; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-19-20(9), 63-19-1440; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 26-8B-2, 26-8B-6; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-102(26), 37-1-132; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.02(15), 51.03(b), 54.05; Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103, 78A-6-105(18); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102, 5318; Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-228 ("[c]hild in need of services"), 16.1-278.4, 16.1-278.6; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030; W. Va. Code §§ 49-1-202 ("[s]tatus offender"), 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-402(a)(iv), 14-6-429. Colorado had similar provisions, which have since been repealed. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(5), (20)(f), repealed by Laws § 1 (effective July 1, 1997). The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes concerning children in need of services or supervision only cover children who are the subject of abandonment, abuse, or neglect, rather than those who are deemed to be engaging in improper or injurious behavior. See Iowa Code §§ 232.2(6), (20), 232.102; Wis. Stat. § 48.13.

[15] See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-201(4); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-201(19)(b); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(24)(A); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120(5); D.C. Code § 16-2301(8)(A)(i); Fla. Stat. § 984.03(9); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-2(11); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(C); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/ § 3-33.5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2022(d)(6); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 159.150, 630.020(3); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 730(1); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e)(1); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. § 260C.007(6)(14), (19); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031(1)(2)(a); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-103(22), (51); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320(1)(a); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-D:2(II)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-3B-2(A); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 712(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27)(a), 7B-2503; N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-02(19); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.022, 2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6302; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(9), 14-1-32; S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(9); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8B-2(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(26)(A); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.02(15)(C); Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103(1)(i), 78A-6-105; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102(3)(D), 5318; Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030(4); W. Va. Code § 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-402(a)(iv).

[16] Mass. G. L. c. 119, § 21 ("[c]hild requiring assistance" includes one who is "habitually truant," meaning he or she "willfully fails to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a quarter"); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4) (family court has jurisdiction over, inter alia, juvenile who "willfully and repeatedly absents himself or herself from [a] school or other learning program intended to meet the juvenile's educational needs"); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii) ("[c]hild in need of supervision" includes one who "willfully and habitually absents himself" from school); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-D:2(II)(a) ("[c]hild in need of services" includes one "[w]ho is subject to compulsory school attendance, and who is habitually, willfully, and without good and sufficient cause truant from school"); 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254(8)(c) (S.B. 718) ("[c]hild or juvenile in need of supervision" includes one who is "willfully and voluntarily absent from school"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-3(9) ("[w]ayward" child includes one who is required to attend school and "willfully and habitually absents himself or herself from school"). Michigan has further held that a child's absences are not wilful, as required by its truancy statute, where they are attributable to illness and fear of bullying, as "Michigan courts must infer a criminal intent for every offense in the absence of an express or implied [l]egislative intent to dispense with criminal intent" (citation omitted). In re Napieraj, 304 Mich. App. 742, 747-748 (2014).

[17] See Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 380-381 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995) (New York's "person in need of supervision" statute requires "[an] intentional failure to attend school" for purposes of truancy; therefore, child with extreme anxiety-based school phobia who was not attending school was not in need of supervision because her will was "overborne by anxiety"). The Vermont Supreme Court declined to adopt Minnesota's approach because it determined that the language of the Vermont statute defining a truant as one who, "being subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually and without justification truant from school," did not imply a volitional element. See Matter of A.V., S.T., A.C., & E.V., 176 Vt. 568, 571 (2003).

[18] Even in such cases, the intervention and other services contemplated under the CRA statute may be a more effective method of changing the child's behavior than bringing the child into court. The design of the CRA statute, with its emphasis on community-based resources, indicates that the Legislature envisioned a deliberate set of escalating measures, in which court intervention would be the last alternative.

[19] If, unlike here, a child's absences were the result of parental neglect such that the child's truant behavior was not found to be wilful, the child could not be adjudicated a child requiring assistance by virtue of habitual truancy and the matter of appropriate custodial arrangements accordingly could not be addressed pursuant to that statute. That being said, however, the matter of parental neglect and custodial arrangements for the child may be addressed in care and protection proceedings brought in the Juvenile Court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, §§ 24, 26. Such proceedings may be brought on behalf of a child who "(a) is without necessary and proper physical or educational care and discipline; (b) is growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's sound character development; (c) lacks proper attention of the parent, guardian with care and custody or custodian; or (d) has a parent, guardian or custodian who is unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention." G. L. c. 119, § 24.

[20] We note that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may have been a more appropriate venue in this case to ensure that M.P. was receiving an adequate education. See G. L. c. 71B, § 2A. This administrative body has authority to provide "adjudicatory hearings, mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution" concerning "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, education program or educational placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to the child." Id."