Thursday, June 21, 2018

VACATING DEFAULT UNDER CPLR 317



Benchmark Farm, Inc. v Red Horse Farm, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04522, Decided on June 20, 2018, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"A defendant who has been served with a summons other than by personal delivery may be allowed to defend the action within one year after he or she obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment upon a finding of the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense (see CPLR 317; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141-142; Dalton v Noah Constr. & Bldrs., Inc., 136 AD3d 730, 731).

Here, the defendant submitted the sworn affidavit of its principal, who stated that the defendant did not learn of the action or the judgment until August 2016, and that approximately one month thereafter it moved to vacate the judgment. The affidavit indicated that in 2003 the [*2]defendant's principal had moved his residence from the address on file with the Secretary of State and that neither the defendant nor its principal had received mail at that address since 2004. The affidavit also provided that the defendant's address had not been updated with the Secretary of State. There is no evidence in the record that the defendant or its agent received actual notice of the summons, which was delivered to the Secretary of State, in time to defend this action (see Dalton v Noah Constr. & Bldrs., Inc., 136 AD3d at 731; Schacker Real Estate Corp. v 553 Burnside Ave., LLC, 133 AD3d 586, 587; Gershman v Midtown Moving & Stor., Inc., 123 AD3d 974, 975). Although the defendant did not explain why it failed to update its address with the Secretary of State, "there is no necessity for a defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 317 to show a reasonable excuse' for its delay" (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d at 141; see Gershman v Midtown Moving & Stor., Inc., 123 AD3d at 975), and there is no basis in the record to conclude that the defendant deliberately attempted to avoid service, especially since the plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant's actual business address and had written to the defendant at that address regarding the dispute that gave rise to the plaintiff's complaint (see Dalton v Noah Constr. & Bldrs., Inc., 136 AD3d at 731; Schacker Real Estate Corp. v 553 Burnside Ave., LLC, 133 AD3d at 587; Gershman v Midtown Moving & Stor., Inc., 123 AD3d at 975)."

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.