REMEMBER COMMENCEMENT AND SERVICE ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS

Chief Administrative Judge Marks released a Memorandum yesterday announcing that, beginning Monday, May 25, "e-filing through the NYSCEF system -- including the filing of new non-essential matters -- will be restored in those counties of the state that have not yet met the benchmarks required" under the Governor's reopening plan, including those in New York City and Long Island.

But have a process server ready to serve in quarantine times because pursuant to CPLR 306-b service of a summons and complaint must be made within 120 days after the commencement of the action, which the court, upon motion, may in its discretion and "upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service" (CPLR 306-b; Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95, 101 [2001]; Chan v Zoubarev, 157 AD3d 851 [2018]). To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, supra at 105-106). The interest of justice standard does not require reasonably diligent efforts at service, but courts, in making their determinations, may consider the presence or absence of diligence, along with other factors (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 105) including the expiration of the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a request by the plaintiff for an extension, and prejudice to the defendant (see Bumpus v New York City Transit Auth.,, 66 AD3d 26, 32 [2009)]).