APPLICATION OF CEEFPA TO BE BROADLY CONSTRUED

CEEFPA is the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 and, according to this court, applies to a tax lien foreclosure action.

NYCTL 2016-A TRUST v. NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH & FAMILY SERVS., INC., 2021 NY Slip Op 21023 - Bronx Supreme Court February 5, 2021:

"...Accordingly, as a threshold matter, this Court must determine if the present action is stayed, either because the present action constitutes a foreclosure proceeding or an eviction within the meaning of CEEPFA.

This Court does not find that the present applications seeking a writ of assistance, and use and occupancy, constitute a foreclosure action for the purposes of CEEPFA. CEEPFA specifically applies to tax lien proceedings. (Part B, Subpart B, § 1.) However, the hardship declaration set forth in that section applies only to the owner of the property. It does not appear that any post-foreclosure proceedings, as such, are subject to any stay under CEEPFA. With respect to foreclosures generally, the CEEPFA does not provide for any type of stay following the execution of judgment, i.e., the sale. (Part B, Subpart A, § 8.) Consequently, even if CEEPFA encompasses this type of post-tax lien sale, by its terms, no stay is provided.

With respect to evictions, CEEPFA defines an "eviction proceeding" as "a summary proceeding to recover possession of real property under article seven of the real property actions and proceedings law relating to a residential dwelling unit or any other judicial or administrative proceeding to recover possession of real property relating to a residential dwelling unit." Part A, § 8(a)(ii) of the Act further provides that, "In any eviction proceeding, if the tenant provides a hardship declaration to the petitioner, the court, or an agent of the petitioner or the court, prior to the execution of the warrant, the execution shall be stayed until at least May 1, 2021. If such hardship declaration is provided to the petitioner or agent of the petitioner, such petitioner or agent shall promptly file it with the court, advising the court in writing the index number of all relevant cases." Such a hardship declaration has been filed in this case, with the defendant tenant Norma Minor alleging both financial hardship and significant health risk. (See NYSCEF Doc. No. 198.)

The scope of the "CEEFPA" with respect to evictions outside of the context of summary proceedings has already been considered in one reported decision. In Jacob Cram Coop., Inc. v Ziolkowski, (2021 NY Misc. LEXIS 246, 2021 NY Slip Op 30174(U) [Sup Ct, NY Co] [Debra A. James, JSC]), the court considered the application of the CEEFPA in the context of an ejectment action pursuant to RPAPL Art. 6 pending in Supreme Court. The Court concluded that an action for ejectment pending in Supreme Court is subject to and governed by CEEFPA. The Court reasoned:

"Plaintiff argues that the Act does not apply here because throughout the relevant sections of the Act only `proceedings' are referenced, not actions, and plaintiff therefore argues that the clear legislative intent was only to apply to evictions related to summary proceedings governed by Article 7 of the RPAPL, and to exclude plenary actions for ejectment. Plaintiff further asserts that the CPLR makes clear delineations between actions and proceedings and the procedures applicable to one are not applicable to the other. Defendant, now currently represented at the time of the hardship filing, argues that the plain meaning of the statute applies to this case.

"The court agrees with defendant that in spite of the failure of the Legislature to specifically use the term "action" as applied to landlord-tenant disputes, the term "eviction proceeding" as defined therein includes New York's current hybrid common law/statutory (RPAPL Art. 6) actions for ejectment as applied to residential tenancies. Plaintiff's interpretation limiting the applicability of the statute is contrary to the Act's definition of "eviction proceeding" as including "any other judicial or administrative proceeding to recover possession of real property relating to a residential dwelling unit." Other than a plenary action for ejectment, the court is unable to discern any other "proceeding" that the legislature could have intended

"Finally, if the Legislature intended the Act to apply to summary proceedings only, it would have stated that clearly without the need to create and define a new and broadened term of `eviction proceedings.'" (Jacob Cram Coop., Inc. v Ziolkowski, supra, 2021 NY Misc. LEXIS 246, *2-4.)

This Court agrees with the foregoing. The statement of legislative intent shows that the applicability of CEEFPA is to be broadly construed. The Legislature has stated that:

"COVID-19 presents a historic threat to public health. Hundreds of thousands of residents are facing eviction or foreclosure due to necessary disease control measures that closed businesses and schools, and triggered mass-unemployment across the state: The pandemic has further interrupted court operations, the availability of counsel, the ability for parties to pay for counsel, and the ability to safely commute and enter a courtroom, settlement conference and the like.

"Stabilizing the housing situation for tenants, landlords, and homeowners is to the mutual benefit of all New Yorkers and will help the state address the pandemic, protect public health, and set the stage for recovery. It is, therefore, the intent of this legislation to avoid as many evictions and foreclosures as possible for people experiencing a financial hardship during the COVID-19 pandemic or who cannot move due to an increased risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." (L. 2020, Ch. 381, Sec. 3).

The Court in Jacob Cram Coop., Inc. noted that CEEFPA contains a broad definition of eviction, ranging beyond summary proceedings under the RPAPL. This Court would add that the definition of "landlord" under the CEEFPA is similarly broad, and "includes a landlord, owner of a residential property and any other person with a legal right to pursue eviction, possessory action or a money judgment for rent, including arrears, owed or that becomes due during the COVID-19 covered period..." (CEEFPA, Part A, § 1(2).) This definition clearly encompasses a purchaser at a tax lien foreclosure sale as an "owner [or] person with a legal right to pursue [a] possessory action."

Because the defendant tenant has alleged both financial hardship, as well as significant health risk, the action is stayed at least until May 1, 2021.^[2] Other courts have noted that an allegation of significant health risk cannot be contested.

The defendants dispute whether the premises are subject to rent stabilization, and further, there are contested issues as to the condition of the premises and the existence of rent-impairing violations. Under these circumstances, use and occupancy pendente lite cannot be awarded without conducting a hearing. (See, e.g., Trump CPS LLP v Meyer, 249 AD2d 22, 670 NYS2d 854 [1st Dept. 1998] [ordering a hearing to determine reasonable value of use and occupancy where the parties disputed the appropriate amount]; Mushlam, Inc. v Nazor, 80 AD3d 471, 473, 916 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27-28 [1st Dept. 2020].) Because the action is stayed, no hearing can be conducted and no final determination can be made as to entitlement or amount of use and occupancy, if any.

Despite the foregoing, because the parties arguments concerned primarily the application of the CEEFPA, and no other issues relating to the statute, the foregoing is without prejudice to any appropriate application, by motion or otherwise, under CEEFPA."