REMOVING OR DISCHARGING A GUARDIAN

MATTER OF LOEW, 2022 NY Slip Op 6436 - NY: Appellate Div., 1st Dept. 2022:

"The Mental Hygiene Law does not support appellants' contention that they were entitled to a testimonial hearing in this case before being removed. Mental Hygiene Law § 81.35 provides that a guardian may be removed when she or he "fails to comply with an order, is guilty of misconduct, or for any other cause which to the court shall appear just" (see Matter of Mary Alice C., 56 AD3d 467, 468 [2d Dept 2008]). A motion on notice, served on the persons specified in Mental Hygiene Law § 81.16(c), is required but there is no statutory right to a hearing (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 81.16[c]; 81.35). This relaxed requirement stands in distinction to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.11(a), which provides that the petition for the appointment of a guardian for an alleged IP, whose liberty interests are at stake, "shall be made only after a hearing" (Matter of Eggleston [Muhammed], 303 AD2d 263, 266 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Ruth TT, 267 AD2d 553, 554-55 [3d Dept 1999]). The reason a guardian has "no due process right to a full hearing," nor is a "full blown" hearing necessary for their removal, is that a guardian has no "property interest" to protect (Matter of Bauer, 216 AD2d 25, 26 [1st Dept 1995], appeal dismissed 86 NY2d 867 [1995], lv dismissed and denied 87 NY2d 952 [1996]).

Although a guardian cannot be summarily removed in the absence of a fully developed record or without any findings, and a hearing may be required where material facts are disputed (see Matter of Roberts, 205 AD3d 562, 563 [1st Dept 2022]), here the parties had not only fully briefed Ferreira's motion, but the salient facts were also known to the court and largely undisputed. A decision to remove a guardian of the person and property of an IP is within the sound discretion of the trial court (Matter of Agam S. B.-L. [Janna W. - Richard P.] 198 AD3d 962, 963 [2d Dept 2021]). Contrary to appellants' contention, a testimonial hearing was not necessary in this case because the court already possessed enough information for it to make findings justifying Mock's and Elias's removal, and they had an opportunity to be heard (cf. Matter of Roberts, 205 AD3d 562).

On the merits, the court properly exercised its discretion in removing Mock and discharging Elias. Undisputed before the court was the fact that Mock did not investigate and make a reasoned determination about the bona fides of the marriage and the prenuptial agreement. The circumstances presented throughout this case were alarming, raising red flags that at the time of the marriage and the prenuptial agreement Edgar was not competent. Mock's defense, that it was what Edgar wanted, misses the point. While it is important to solicit the views of an IP, those views cannot be the sole basis for action (or inaction). Were that the case, there would be no reason to appoint a guardian in the first place. Moreover, Mock is incorrect in adopting the position that she had no duty to investigate. The order did not have to expressly direct her to investigate these troubling circumstances, which implicated possible serious financial abuse. A guardian's duties under the Mental Hygiene Law require that such action be taken. While such an investigation need not be undertaken in every case, here the issue was squarely raised in the court evaluator's report, identified by the court as an issue for Mock to address as guardian, and warranted given that the prenuptial agreement and marriage occurred so close in time to the filing and granting of the article 81 petition, further buttressed by the evidence demonstrating how severely compromised Edgar was. Mock's failure to investigate was in dereliction of her duties.

Moreover, also undisputed in this record is the fact that Mock did not comply with the court's order that she report back on the feasibility of Edgar's safe discharge from the hospital to his apartment, rather than the ALF. Once again, Mock's reliance on Edgar's preference, without further elaboration as to why he preferred the ALF or an independent inquiry to determine whether it was the best option for him, was a dereliction of duties, undermining the very reason she was appointed. The court was direct in requesting that some evaluation be made as to why, given Edgar's considerable financial worth, he could not be cared for in his home.

These undisputed facts provide a sufficient basis for Mock's removal and Elias's discharge because it was in Edgar's best interest (see Matter of Bauer, 216 AD2d at 26; Mental Hygiene Law § 81.35). The March 8, 2022, appointment of a successor guardian was unavoidable and necessary given that once Mock was removed, Edgar still needed a guardian of the person and property."