The risk of going to trial in a divorce is that not all issues will be addressed.
Rothman v. Rothman, Date Filed:2025-06-27, Supreme Court, New York, Justice Paul A. Goetz:
".....
While defendant is correct that in the divorce action, the Nassau County court stated that it found plaintiff's allegations of domestic abuse credible it did not make any determinations as to whether plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for personal injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of domestic abuse. The divorce proceeding was limited to a division of the marital assets, and plaintiff was not seeking compensatory damages for the incidents of abuse. While the court did contemplate the alleged abuse, this was part of an analysis of plaintiff's future earning capacity as relevant to making a determination on monthly spousal support payments.1 Therefore, the issues in the divorce proceeding and this one are not identical and the case will not be dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
As to defendant's arguments that the divorce action bars this action under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "principles of res judicata require that once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" (Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer, 6 NY3d 94, 100 [2005]). "In the context of a matrimonial action,…a final judgment of divorce settles the parties' rights pertaining not only to those issues that were actually litigated, but also to those that could have been litigated" (id.). However, the doctrine must not be applied too stringently as to avoid a situation where "in properly seeking to deny a litigant two 'days in court', courts…deprive [the litigant] of one" (id.).In Chen, the Court of Appeals recognized that New York courts have properly applied claim preclusion, following a divorce proceeding, to subsequent actions for conversion or to settle title disputes (see Partlow v. Kolupa, 69 NY2d 927 [1987] [former wife's failure to raise conversion claim against former husband in divorce action barred former wife's later action for conversion]; see also Boronow v. Boronow, 71 NY2d 284, 290 [1988] ["In a matrimonial action, where the essential objective is to dissolve the marriage relationship, questions pertaining to important ancillary issues like title to marital property are certainly intertwined and constitute issues which generally can be fairly and efficiently resolved with the core issue"]). However, distinguishing subsequent cases whose core issue involved disputes over real or personal property which are suitable for resolution in a divorce proceeding, the Court held that "a personal injury action is not sufficiently intertwined with the dissolution of the marriage relationship as to allow for its efficient resolution" in that proceeding (Chen, 6 NY3d at 101). Thus, the Court declined to apply claim preclusion to bar a subsequent personal injury action brought by an ex-spouse as an "interspousal tort action does not form a convenient trial unit with the divorce proceeding, and it would not be within the parties' reasonable expectations that the two would be tried together" (id.). Therefore, the action will not be dismissed under the doctrine of claim preclusion."




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