BUTRYM v. BURNT HILLS-BALLSTON LAKE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dist. Court, ND New York 2022:
"To make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) her employer is subject to the ADA; (2) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (4) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2020).[7] A failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA relies on the first three factors, but substitutes the fourth factor with the question of whether the employer has refused to make a reasonable accommodation. Id.
Upon review, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both of these claims because Butrym has failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding whether she was "disabled." Generally speaking, the ADA defines a "disability" as any "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Importantly, however, "[n]ot every impairment is a `disability' within the meaning of the ADA." Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). Instead, there are two general qualifications: (1) the impairment must limit a "major life activity" and (2) the limitation must be "substantial." Id.
As to the first requirement, major life activities include physical functions like walking, standing, and lifting as well as other common activities such as reading, concentrating, and working. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). As to the second requirement, a plaintiff's impairment must "substantially limit[ ] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii).
In 2008, Congress amended the text of the ADA "to make clear that the substantial-limitation requirement in the definition of `disability' is not an exacting one." Woolf 949 F.3d at 94. Even so, it remains the case that "[n]ot every impairment that affects an individual's major life activities is a substantially limiting impairment." B.C. v. Mt. Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Thus, "in assessing whether a plaintiff has a disability, [courts] have been careful to distinguish impairments which merely affect major life activities from those that substantially limit those activities." Id. (emphases in original).
Viewed in the light most favorable to her, the evidence establishes that Butrym informed her supervisors on multiple occasions that she suffers from anxiety, OCD, and autism. The evidence further establishes that plaintiff demanded to be kept separate from Quinn, a co-worker who aggravated her anxiety and made her feel physically sick.
But those facts do not establish a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. As the Second Circuit recently reiterated, "the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Woolf, 949 F.3d at 95 (affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiff who alleged disability from migraines that were exacerbated by job-related stress from supervisors' criticisms). Courts have applied this general rule to conclude that the inability to work with a particular co-worker or supervisor (as opposed to a limitation in the plaintiff's ability to work more generally or work in a broad range of jobs) does not qualify as a "substantial limitation" on the major life activity of "working." See, e.g., Shields v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 3d 155, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing a failure-to-accommodate claim where plaintiff alleged "only that his purported disabilities prevent him from working" with a particular co-worker and a single supervisor); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Standing alone, a personality conflict between an employee and a supervisor — even one that triggers the employee's depression — is not enough to establish that the employee is disabled, so long as the employee could still perform the job under a different supervisor.")
In Butrym, it was noted that this body of ADA caselaw was likely fatal to plaintiff's claims. 2021 WL 1927073, at *5 & n.7. However, as explained, it was "reluctant to reach this conclusion at the pleadings stage, especially where, as here, the plaintiff is pro se." Id. at n.7. At the time, there remained the possibility that plaintiff, though unrepresented by counsel, might be able to establish in discovery that her impairments were substantially more limiting than her pleading suggested. Discovery has shown that they are not. As Butrym herself explained at her deposition:
Q. And so when you say that you can do the job without a reasonable accommodation, as long as you're not assigned with Megan Quinn, you're saying you don't need any accommodation; correct?
A. Correct. Her behavior to this day is still an obsession of me. And as long as that's controlled — you know, it's still going on today so it doesn't matter if we're together or not, you know, employee-wise. But going further, it just — you know, she has to be spoken to.
Q. Okay. But there's nothing else about the job that you can't do, provided Megan Quinn is not assigned to the bus you're on?
A. Correct. I mean, like again she needs to be told, you know, "Stop obsessing with her."
Pl.'s Tr. at 78:7-78:25.
In other words, Butrym's discrimination and accommodation claims do not rest on broad limitations in her ability to "work" that might be attributed to her diagnosed impairments. Cf. Weiss v. Cty. of Suffolk, 416 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ("It is insufficient for a plaintiff to prove a disability on the basis of a diagnosis alone—that is, not every impairment is a disability."). Instead, these claims rest on symptoms that arise solely from plaintiff's interactions with Quinn, who was occasionally assigned to her as a co-worker. Because plaintiff has not shown that these work-induced symptoms "substantially limited [her] ability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that [she] has a `disability' within the meaning of the ADA." Woolf, 949 F.3d at 95. Even assuming otherwise, Butrym has failed to establish that the termination of her employment by Czub and/or Sarsick was just a pretext for unlawful disability discrimination. See McBride v. BIC Consumer Products Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Frantti v. New York, 414 F. Supp. 3d 257, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (observing that on summary judgment ADA claims for employment discrimination are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
Defendants' submissions establish Mazure and Sarsick conducted a prompt investigation into Butrym's first complaint about Quinn. These submissions further establish that defendants concluded plaintiff's complaints were without merit and, in fact, plaintiff was not properly performing her own duties as a school bus monitor. Plaintiff's second complaint about Quinn led to a second investigation, which again revealed to defendants that plaintiff was "not doing her job" and that her complaints about Quinn's behavior "were unfounded."
The parties agree that these events culminated in a meeting on March 25, 2019. There, the parties discussed "a number of concerns regarding [plaintiff's] employment," including various things that, in her supervisors' view, justified the termination of her employment. Although plaintiff denies being guilty of "poor work performance" and insists that at least some of her alleged misconduct (e.g., gift-giving to children) was not against the rules, both parties agree that plaintiff walked out of this meeting and was fired shortly afterward.
Even if it were to resolve those disputed facts in her favor, no reasonable jury could conclude that Butrym's impairments were the but-for cause of this adverse employment action. A review of plaintiff's deposition transcript reveals that while she denies certain alleged deficiencies in her work performance, she concedes others. Absent more, no factfinder could return a verdict in plaintiff's favor on this discrimination claim. Cf. Canales-Jacobs v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 640 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The ADA does not excuse workplace misconduct because the misconduct is related to a disability.").
To the extent Butrym's ADA claim might be construed as a request for an accommodation that involved no contact with Quinn, a single co-worker, that request was unreasonable as matter of law. See, e.g., Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying pre-amendment ADA law to conclude that plaintiff's "request to be transferred away from individuals causing him prolonged and inordinate stress" was "unreasonable as a matter of law under the ADA" in terms of an accommodation).
In sum, even viewed in the light most favorable to her and construed liberally in light of her pro se status, Butrym has failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in her favor on either of these ADA claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims must be dismissed."
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