A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME...

The child or "infant" in this case is approximately 14 years old and the mother wants to change the last name from father's to mother's.

Matter of A. Sve, Date filed: 2021-07-21, Court: Civil Court, Queens, Judge: Judge Wendy Changyong Li, Case Number: NC-000058-20/QU:

"Background 

A. Sve (“Petitioner”) sought to change the name of her son, Jon. Spe (“Infant”), to Jon. Sve. Infant’s father, M. Spe (“Father”), objected to the name change. This matter was previously adjourned before other courts and was subsequently assigned to this Court on May 27, 2021, on which day, this Court conducted a name change hearing where the Petitioner, the Infant, and the Father appeared via Microsoft Teams live video, pursuant to a hearing schedule established by the prior courts. 

Discussion

Civil Rights Law states that:

If the court to which the [name change] petition is satisfied thereby, or by the affidavit and certificate presented therewith, that the petition is true, and that there is no reasonable objection to the change of name proposed, and if the petition be to change the name of an infant, that the interests of the infant will be substantially promoted by the change, the court shall make an order authorizing the petitioner to assume the name proposed.

Civ. Rts Law §63.

The first prong of evaluating a child’s name change petition is the absence of a reasonable objection to the name change. Objections to the name change must relate to the infant’s best interests or the objecting parent’s relationship with the infant (Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 123; Matter of Kobra [Hossain], 46 Misc 3d 54, 56 [App. Term 2d Dept 2014]). In our modern society, a child need not assume a father’s last name, may take a mother’s last name, and in adulthood, may choose another name altogether as adherence or non-adherence to old tradition does not necessarily impact either the infant’s interest or parent-child relations (see Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 123; Matter of Kobra [Hossain], 46 Misc 3d at 56). In our instant matter, the Father testified to various conflicts with the Petitioner arising from their contested divorce. The Father’s only testimony that pertained to the name change was that the Petitioner, not the Infant, was behind the request for the name change, and that having the Infant to carry his name was all the Father had left. However, the Petitioner and the Infant both testified that the Infant was the one requesting the name change. The Father did not answer the Court’s specific inquiry as to the significance of the Infant having the Father’s last name, and instead referred to a discussion with the Infant regarding hyphenating the last names of the Petitioner and the Father. The Infant spontaneously denied such a discussion and denied it again in later testimony. The Infant specifically rejected hyphenating the names on the ground that it would contain the Father’s last name. The Father identified no specific benefit to the Infant for keeping the Father’s last name nor any specific detriment to the Infant for taking the Petitioner’s last name. To the extent the Father raised any objections to the name change, they were unrelated to the Infant’s best interests and related instead to concerns for himself and the contentious relationship between the Father and the Petitioner (see Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 121-22).

Failing to visit the Infant is a further ground for rejecting the Father’s objections (see Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 124; In re Cruz, 49 Misc 3d 155[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51805[U] *1 [App Term 2d Dept 2015]). Although the Father generally suggested that the Petitioner interfered with his visitation, the Petitioner testified that she did not prevent the Infant from contacting the Father and that the Father had only seen the now 13 year old Infant four (4) times since the Infant was two years old. The Infant also testified that the Father had not been a part of his life.

Under the second prong, this Court may change an infant’s name only upon finding that the “interests of the infant will be substantially promoted by the change” (Matter of Stone v. Weinberg, 189 AD3d 1425, 1426 [2d Dept 2020]; Matter of Rudder v. Garber, 164 AD3d 511, 511 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d 116, 121 [2d Dept 2011]; Matter of John Phillip M.-P., 41 AD3d 720, 721 [2d Dept 2007]); Matter of Siira, 7 AD3d 803, 803 [2d Dept 2004]). The court must evaluate the infant’s best interests in the totality of the circumstances (Matter of Stone v. Weinberg, 189 AD3d at 1426; Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 123). Neither parent has a superior right to determine their child’s name (Matter of Stone v. Weinberg, 189 AD3d at 1426; Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 123). Here, the Infant’s sharing the last name of his mother, the Petitioner, with whom he lives, is a valid concern as it would reduce embarrassment, harassment, and confusion in educational and social scenarios as the Infant testified during the hearing (Matter of John Phillip M.-P., 307 AD2d 318. 318-19 [2d Dept 2003]). The Infant testified that his mother, the Petitioner, raised him and that having his Father’s last name was like having a “random stranger’s name” (Transcript at 13). In addition, the Infant testified that his cousins often told him that he was “not part of the family because [he had a] different last name” than his cousins, which was Sve (Id. at 20). Using the Microsoft Teams breakout room feature, this Court separately spoke to the Infant outside the presence of both the Petitioner and the Father. The Infant alone testified that he considered his grandfather to be his father because he drove him to practice and that the family members with whom he spent time were Sve(s). The Infant testified several times that having a different name from his mother, the Petitioner, and the family with whom he spent time felt “weird” (Transcript at 19-20, 22). The Infant testified that he wanted the same last name as his mother, the Petitioner, for a sense of community.

Based upon the testimonies of the Petitioner, the Father and the Infant during the hearing, this Court finds that the Father had minimal contact with the Infant since he left the household, that Infant had substantial, ongoing contact with the Petitioner’s family who shared the Petitioner’s surname, and was potentially exposed to embarrassment and confusion by having his Father’s surname, while residing with his mother, the Petitioner. Under these circumstances, the name change would substantially promote the Infant’s interests (see Matter of Eberhardt, 83 AD3d at 124-25, see In re Cruz, 2015 NY Slip Op 51805[U] *1). Therefore, this Court grants Petitioner’s petition."