Berde v North Shore- Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 03955, Decided on June 6, 2018, Appellate Division, Second Department:
"The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for unlawful
termination of employment in violation of Labor Law § 740. After years
of discovery and motion practice, including two appeals in which this
Court vindicated the plaintiff's right to proceed with this action (
see Berde v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 98 AD3d 932, 932-933;
Berde v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 50 AD3d 834,
835-836), the Supreme Court, following a nonjury trial, decided in
favor of the defendant in a decision dated July 25, 2014. In an order
dated October 21, 2014, the court awarded the defendant attorneys' fees
and costs pursuant to Labor Law § 740(6) in the sum of $591,071.70. The
court entered a judgment dated March 20, 2015, upon the decision and the
order. In an order dated September 8, 2015, the court granted the
plaintiff's motion
[*2]for leave to reargue
the award of attorneys' fees and costs, but upon reargument, adhered to
its original determination. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment and
the order dated September 8, 2015.
Although the decision of the trial court upon which the judgment was based did not state the essential facts (
see
CPLR 4213[b]), this Court has before it the complete trial record,
which is sufficient to conduct an independent review of the evidence so
as to make the requisite findings of fact (
see Park E. Constr. Corp. v East Coast Mech. Servs., Inc., 133 AD3d 581, 582;
Hugh O'Kane Elec. Co., LLC. v MasTec N. Am., Inc., 45 AD3d 413, 414;
Atlantic Contr. Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
155 AD2d 571, 572). " In reviewing a determination rendered after a
nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial
court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the
facts'" (
Galbraith v Westchester County Health Care Corp., 140 AD3d 696, 697, quoting
Furino v O'Sullivan, 137 AD3d 1208,
1209-1210). Upon our independent review, we conclude that the
determination to dismiss the complaint was warranted by the facts
presented at trial (
see Hookman v Lenox Hill Hosp., 241 AD2d 333,
333). In particular, the weight of the evidence established that the
defendant had a nonretaliatory justification for dismissing the
plaintiff, as she had numerous conflicts with other hospital staff and
failed to improve in that respect despite opportunities to do so.
Labor Law § 740(6) provides that a court, in its discretion, may
award an employer attorneys' fees and costs if it determines that the
employee's action is " without basis in law or in fact'" (
Tomo v Episcopal Health Servs., Inc., 85 AD3d 766,
768-769, quoting Labor Law § 740[6]). Here, the trial record included
testimonial and documentary evidence of the plaintiff's numerous
complaints about ongoing sterility problems in the operating room, which
problems arguably constituted a violation of applicable regulations and
posed a present, substantial, and specific danger to patient health.
The plaintiff and other witnesses testified that these issues arose
hundreds of times over the relevant time period and were not seriously
addressed until after the plaintiff finally complained to her
supervisor's supervisor. The plaintiff's annual performance evaluations
demonstrate that she met or exceeded expectations throughout her tenure
as a nurse manager and, despite identifying areas for improvement, did
not indicate a risk of dismissal until after she complained to upper
management. While ultimately unpersuasive in light of the defendant's
evidence, the plaintiff's action "cannot reasonably be characterized as
being without basis in law or in fact'" (
Lukose v Long Is. Med. Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., 120 AD3d 1312,
1313-1314, quoting Labor Law § 740[6]). The Supreme Court therefore
improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Labor Law § 740(6)."