NY CHILD CUSTODY - JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY ISSUES

SCOLAVINO v. SCOLAVINO, 247 AD 3d 1078 - NY: Appellate Div., 2nd Dept. 2026:

"In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Victor G. Grossman, J.), dated October 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for declarations that a so-ordered stipulation of settlement dated July 8, 2024, required the parties to consult in good faith and reach joint decisions regarding all major decisions concerning their children and that such major decisions included matters beyond the children's health, education, and religion.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In June 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief. The parties entered into a so-ordered stipulation of settlement dated July 8, 2024, which included, inter alia, terms relating to custody and parental access of the parties' two children. The stipulation provided, among other things, that "[t]he parties in this matter will have joint legal custody of the two minor children," that "[t]he parties are going to utilize ... a parent coordinator solely for major decisions of health, education and religion," and that the parties would "be guided by the recommendation of the [parent coordinator] in making major decisions," with the party whose position the parent coordinator supported being permitted to implement that decision, subject to the other party's right to seek a stay from a court of competent jurisdiction. The stipulation further provided that the plaintiff would have primary residential custody of the children, subject to the defendant's parental access schedule, and that each party would be entitled to make the day-to-day decisions for the children while they were in his or her care.

In September 2024, the defendant moved for declarations, among other things, that the stipulation (1) required the parties to consult in good faith and reach joint decisions regarding all major decisions concerning the children, and (2) defined major decisions to include not only matters of the children's health, education, and religion, but also decisions relating to dental, therapeutic, and psychiatric treatment, extracurricular activities, summer camp and summer programs, day care and day care facilities, and tutoring. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated October 15, 2024, the Supreme Court, 1079*1079 inter alia, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for declarations that the stipulation required the parties to consult in good faith and reach joint decisions regarding all major decisions concerning the children and that such major decisions included matters beyond the children's health, education, and religion. The plaintiff appeals.

"A stipulation of settlement is a contract subject to the principles of contract construction and interpretation" (Sabau v Sabau, 222 AD3d 1017, 1019 [2023]). "A court should interpret the stipulation in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and `arrive at a construction that will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized'" (id., quoting Matter of Schiano v Hirsch, 22 AD3d 502, 502 [2005]). "`Where the stipulation is clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence'" (Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d 849, 850 [2023], quoting Oakes v Oakes, 38 AD3d 865, 865 [2007]). "Joint custody reposes in both parents a shared responsibility for and control of a child's upbringing" and thus requires "the parties ... to communicate and cooperate on matters concerning the child" (Matter of Lee v Fitts, 147 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the stipulation, as placed on the record in open court, is clear and unambiguous (see Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d at 850). Read as a whole, the stipulation reflects the parties' agreement to share joint legal custody of the children and, consistent with the ordinary meaning of that term, to consult in good faith and attempt to jointly resolve all major decisions concerning the children, while specifically carving out a subset of such decisions—those relating to health, education, and religion— for nonjudicial dispute resolution through the parent coordinator (see Matter of Lee v Fitts, 147 AD3d at 1059). Issues such as dental care, summer camp, summer programs, day care, therapy, psychiatric care, and extracurricular activities fall within the umbrella of the categories in the stipulation for which nonjudicial dispute resolution applies.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for declarations that the stipulation required the parties to consult in good faith and jointly resolve all major decisions concerning the children and that such major decisions included matters beyond the children's health, education, and religion."

DETERMINING RESIDENTIAL CUSTODY BY OVERNIGHTS

For this court in the Second Department, when the parenting time is joint and shared, the parent who spends more overnights with the children is deemed the custodial parent for child support purposes.

Matter of Aileen S. v. Michael D., NYLJ August 31, 2020, Date filed: 2020-05-07, Court: Family Court, Nassau, Judge: Support Magistrate Sondra Toscano, Case Number: F-00984-20:

"The parties have never been married and have two children in common, Chiara D. and Michelangelo D. On January 27, 2020, the mother, Aileen S. (hereinafter “Mother” or “Ms. S.”) filed a support petition against the father, Michael D. (hereinafter “Father” or “Mr. D.”). In her petition, she alleges that she is entitled to child support because she asserts that the parties’ final order of custody and parenting time grants “the parties’ [sic] joint legal custody and shared parenting time.” On February 26, 2020, Mr. D. filed a motion to dismiss. In his papers, Mr. D. argues that Ms. S. is not entitled to child support because although the parties were awarded joint legal custody, the final order does not delineate residential custody. On March 16, 2020, Ms. S. filed opposition papers. Thereafter, the Court conducted two Skype conferences with the parties’ attorneys. Despite efforts to settle the motion, a resolution could not be reached. Both parties submitted supplementary papers which they agreed would be considered by the Court for the purposes of deciding the motion. On May 1, 2020, the motion was marked submit. Having considered the parties’ papers, the law, and counsels’ arguments, the Court’s determination is as follows:

DISCUSSION

A party to a family court action may file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §165(a) (McKinney’s 2020) (FCA adopts and applies CPLR where FCA is silent); see also See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §3211(a)(7) (McKinney’s 2020). In its analysis, the Court must construe the petition liberally to determine whether, within the pleading’s four corners, there exists a cognizable cause of action. See Harris v. Barbera, 96 A.D.3d 904, 905 (2d Dep’t 2012); see also Martin v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 92 A.D.3d 729, 730 (2d Dep’t 2012); Ruffino v. New York City Transit Auth., 55 A.D.3d 817, 818 (2d Dep’t 2008). To that end, the Court must accept all alleged facts within the pleadings to be true. See Martin, 92 A.D.3d at 730; see also Young v. Campbell, 87 A.D.3d 692, 693 (2d Dep’t 2011). In other words, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be granted only where, accepting the petition’s alleged facts as true, the moving papers establish conclusively that there is no claim for relief stated within the petition. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §3221(a)(7) (McKinney’s 2020); see also Noble v. Graham, 8 A.D.3d 641, 641 (2d Dep’t 2004); Fields v. Leeponis, 95 A.D.2d 822, 822 (2d Dep’t 1983). Although Ms. S.’s petition states that she is entitled to support for the benefit of the parties’ two children, the Court finds that under the law, the relief she seeks is not warranted, and dismisses her petition.

For the purposes of calculating child support, a custodial parent is a parent who has physical custody for a majority of time. See Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 728 (1998); see also Watson v. Maragh, 147 A.D.3d 769, 769 (2d Dep’t 2017); Conway v. Gartmond, 144 A.D.3d 795, 796 (2d Dep’t 2016); Ambrose v. Felice, 45 A.D.3d 581, 582 (2d Dep’t 2007). It is well-settled in the Second Department that where neither parent has the children for the majority of the time, the non custodial parent is deemed to be the more monied spouse.¹ See Conway, 144 A.D.3d at 796 (citing cases). Where, as here, the parties disagree about whom has the children most of the time, a court must make a determination as to whom is the primary custodial parent. See Bast, 91 N.Y.2d at 728. There is no controlling law in the Second Department in that regard.

The stare decisis doctrine requires Second Department trial courts to follow precedents set forth in sister departments until controlling law in the Court of Appeals or Second Department is established. See Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storm, 102 A.D.2d 663, 664(2d Dep’t 1984). Where there are differing views in sister departments, a Court is able choose which approach it deems to be the better one and apply it. See Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc., 102 A.D.2d at 664 66; Matter of Faragiano, 46 Misc. 3d 646, 649 (Erie Cty. Surr. Ct., Oct. 29, 2014) (citing cases). The First and Third Departments hold that the parent who spends more overnights with the children is the custodial parent. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 134 A.D.3d 1213, 1214-215 (3d Dep’t 2015); Rubin v. Della Salla, 107 A.D.3d 60, 67-73 (1st Dep’t 2013); Smith v. Smith, 97 A.D.3d 923, 924 (3d Dep’t 2012). The Fourth Department holds that where there is an approximately even distribution of parenting time, the parent with the greater income is the non-custodial parent. See Brink v. Brink, 178 A.D.3d 1369, 1371 (4th Dep’t 2019); see also Rapp v. Horbett, 174 A.D.3d 1315, 1316 (4th Dep’t 2019). Mr. D. maintains that he has more overnights with the children and urges the Court to follow the First and Third Departments. Ms. S. urges the Court to follow the Fourth Department because she maintains that the parties enjoy shared parenting time with the children. She further asserts that she was awarded more waking hours with the children.

The Court finds the reasoning and holding in the First and Third Departments to be more persuasive than the Fourth Department. In Rubin v. Della Salla, 107 A.D.3d 60 (1st Dep’t 2013), the court sets forth a thorough analysis of its conclusion that overnights are the determinative factor. The Rubin court found that “[a]n hour-by-hour analysis of custodial time is just not workable and would run afoul of the ‘greater uniformity [and] predictability’ the CSSA was designed to promote.” Id. at 70. The Rubin court explained that: (1) the number of waking hours does not accomplish the goal of child support, which is to help a custodial parent provide the children with basic necessities; (2) since children’s daily activities are constantly ever-changing, children may not actually be with a parent during daytime hours; and, (3) the waking hours approach promotes manipulation by parents in trying to achieve the custodial parent designation. Id. Moreover, other New York trial courts have consistently followed the overnight approach.² See E.I. v. Y.A., 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1230, at *19 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct., Mar. 20, 2018); see also J.R. v. M.S., 56 Misc. 3d 975, 988-89 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct., May 5, 2017); Joseph M. Lauren J., 45 Misc. 3d 1211(A) (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct., Oct. 22, 2014). Ms. S. acknowledges that Mr. D. enjoys more overnights with the children.³ Thus, applying the relevant law set forth in the First and Third Departments, the Court finds that Ms. S. is not the children’s custodial parent.⁴ Accordingly, accepting all alleged facts within the pleadings to be true, the Court finds that Ms. S. has failed to sufficiently set forth a cause of action.

Footnotes

1. There is no dispute amongst the parties that Mr. D. is the parent with the greater income.
2. The Court notes parenthetically that most recently, one New York trial court found that where the parties had roughly equal parenting time, the more monied spouse was the noncustodial parent. See Warshaw v. Warshaw, 2020 N.Y.L.J. LEXIS 415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 2020). However, the Court declines to adopt this view as it is not appellate authority and is contrary to all prior New York trial court decisions, on the issue, within the Second Department. See Kolanu Partners, LLC v. Perry, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3344, at *5 (N.Y. Cty. Civil Ct., Sept. 16, 2015) (court decision of equal or inferior jurisdiction "is not necessarily controlling, through entitled to respectful consideration."); see also Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. v. Stanley, 49 Misc. 3d 746, 770 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct., July 29, 2015) (same).
3. Ms. S. concedes such in an affidavit, dated June 21, 2019, submitted during a prior child support proceeding and attached as Exhibit F to Mr. D.'s motion to dismiss as well as a spreadsheet provided in Ms. S.'s supplemental papers on the instant motion.
4. The Court notes anecdotally that the children reside primarily with Mr. D. for 10 months out of the year. In the Honorable Ayesha Brantley's (hereinafter "Judge Brantley") Decision and Order, dated March 29, 2019, she granted "residential custody to [Mr. D.] solely for the purpose of determining the children's school district and a shared parenting schedule between the parties." Although she "endeavored to create a schedule that is balanced and affords both parties meaningful and regular access to the children," Judge Brantley found that "the children's interests are best served by residing with [their father] primarily during the school year (September through June) and residing with [their mother] primarily during the summer months (July and August)." Id.

CHILD SUPPORT WHEN CUSTODY IS SHARED

Alliger-Bograd v Bograd, 2020 NY Slip Op 01315, Decided on February 26, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in determining the amount of his child support obligation based on the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter CSSA) guidelines, as the parties have shared custody of the children, and that the parties should split all child support obligations evenly. The CSSA "sets forth a formula for calculating child support by applying a designated statutory percentage, based upon the number of children to be supported, to combined parental income up to a particular ceiling" (Matter of Murray v Murray, 164 AD3d 1451, 1453 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Where the combined parental income exceeds that ceiling, the court, in fixing the basic child support obligation on income over the ceiling, has the discretion to apply the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(f), or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both" (Candea v Candea, 173 AD3d at 664; see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][c][3]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 655). In Bast v Rossoff (91 NY2d 723, 728), the Court of Appeals held that the CSSA was applicable to shared custody arrangements. The CSSA is also applicable to situations where each party has equal custodial time with the children (see Baraby v Baraby, 250 AD2d 201, 204). In cases where custody is shared equally, the parent having the greater share of the support obligation after applying the statutory formula is identified as the "noncustodial" parent for the purposes of support (see id. at 204). However, if the statutory formula "yields a result that is unjust or inappropriate," the court "can resort to the paragraph (f)' factors and order payment of an amount that is just and appropriate" (Bast v Rossoff, 91 NY2d at 729, citing Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][f], [g]; see Baraby v Baraby, 250 AD2d at 204). Here, the court appropriately applied the CSSA to determine the award of child support, and we find no basis to disturb the court's determination."