ARE LOCAL "GOOD CAUSE EVICTION LAWS" VALID?

"ORDERED, that the GCEL enacted by the City of Poughkeepsie Common Council is deemed unconstitutional, thereby rendering it VOID and UNENFORCEABLE under New York State's "Preemption Doctrine"; and it is further"

LAKR KAAL ROCK, LLC v. Paul, 2023 NY Slip Op 23070 - Dutch Co. City Court 2023:

"As a preliminary matter, this Court is a court constitutionally enacted pursuant to the New York State Constitution [NY CONST. Art. IV, §17] with jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional legal issues. People v. Jackson, 76 Misc 2d 872 affirmed 36 NY2d 726 (1975); People v. Zongone, 102 Misc 2d 265 (Yonkers City Court 1979)(court held that NY disorderly conduct statute was constitutional); People v. Milio, 112 Misc 2d 949 (Yonkers City Court 1982) citing National Psych. Assn. et al v. University of State of NY, 18 Misc 2d 722, 725-26 affirmed 10 AD2d 688 affirmed 8 NY2d 197 (court should declare statutes unconstitutional that affect life and liberty and where the invalidity of the statute is apparent on its face); People v. Jack Resnick and Sons, Inc., 127 Misc 2d 1031(Yonkers City Court 1985)(upholding local ordinance and finding that if the constitutional questions raised in a court of limited jurisdiction are debatable, the court must declare the ordinance constitutional, and must not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body); People v. Trolio, 170 Misc 2d 1017 (Village of Scarsdale 1996)(finding code limiting leaf blowers constitutional).

Secondly, respondent incorrectly contends that petitioner is seeking declaratory relief from this Court. The instant proceeding was commenced by petitioner pursuant to R.P.A.P.L. § 711(1), and the constitutionality and enforceability of the GCEL is inextricably intertwined with the facts set forth within the instant summary proceeding and central to the issues.

Third, Corporation Counsel's Office was timely and properly notified pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 1012. There are no procedural timing requirements setting forth when or how notice must be provided under C.P.L.R. § 1012(b). Moreover, in local government challenges, there is nothing that even imposes the notice obligation on the party raising the constitutional issue. Rather it is only implied. The statutory requirement that a motion for intervention be "timely" under C.P.L.R. § 1012, adds an element of judicial discretion to the "right" to intervene. (Alexander Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C102:5) "The principal guideposts in the valuation of timeliness are whether disposition of the action will be unduly delayed and whether the original parties will be prejudiced." Id. citing Norstar Apts., Inc. v. Town of Clay, 112 AD2d 750, 751 (4th Dept. 1985). Cf. C.P.L.R. 1013. See, e.g., Halstead v. Dolphy, 70 AD3d 639 (2d Dept. 2010)(intervention was not sought until more than four years from action's commencement). Here, once petitioner constitutionally challenged the GCEL, the parties were ordered by this Court that Corporation Counsel's Office was to be notified by petitioner and provided an opportunity to intervene. It is undisputed that notice was timely provided by petitioner to Corporation Counsel's Office, and undisputed that Corporation Counsel consented to the documentation being emailed. O'Fallon affirmation, dated January 23, 2022 [sic], ¶ 1-14. Petitioner complied with this Court's Order, Corporation Counsel intervened on behalf of the City of Poughkeepsie, their papers have been considered, and the parties have not demonstrated prejudice in any way. Halstead v. Dolphy, supra (holding that intervention may occur at any time provided it does not unduly delay the action or prejudice existing parties).

Fourth, Corporation Counsel's erroneous claim that it has been deprived of its right to appeal an adverse decision as an intervenor^[3], is wrong. A successful intervenor acquires the same status as that of an original party. See, e.g., NY Central RR Co., v. Lefkowitz, 19 AD2d 548 (2d Dept. 1963)(holding that once intervenors become parties to an action, they are to all intents and purposes considered original parties); Halstead v. Dolphy, supra at 640; Berkoski v. Trustees of Inc. Village of Southampton, 67 AD3d 840 (2d Dept. 2009); Paez v. Varveris, 12 Misc 3d 101 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2006).

Fifth, the Court rejects the City's argument that petitioner has unclean hands.

Sixth, the Court rejects the City's argument that the motion should be decided without passing on the constitutionality of the GCEL. While courts must exercise judicial restraint, a court may not avoid a constitutional issue by interpreting a challenged statute in a manner that produces an absurd or unreasonable result. Matter of Shernise C., 91 AD3d 26 (2d Dept. 2011). Likewise, legislative enactments are to be construed so as to avoid constitutional issues if doing so is fairly possible. Matter of Waterways Dev. Corp. v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Board of Appeals, 126 AD3d 708 (2d Dept. 2015). However, here, central to the proceeding, is the GCEL, and whether it is constitutional, or void and unenforceable. This Court cannot avoid addressing the legality surrounding the challenged statute without reaching an absurd result. A decision on this issue dictates the course of this proceeding. As such, the merits of the statute's constitutionality and enforceability are addressed below.

Finally, contrary to arguments made by Corporation Counsel [Longcore affirmation, dated January 4, 2023, ¶ 29], the function of the judicial branch is not to render decisions that ensure public debate and outcry, nor is it to ensure input from the media. Indeed, its role and decisions must be insulated from such things. The judiciary must exercise fairness and impartiality in its decisions. It must protect the rights of individuals, ensure equal justice, interpret and apply the law, and be a guardian of the Constitution. As such, to the extent that the City argues that the Court should decline to exercise its power to rule on this issue for these reasons, same is wholly rejected.

The GCEL's constitutionality and enforceability

The general rule of law is that municipalities have the right to enact ordinances that tend to preserve good order, peace, health, and the safety and welfare of its inhabitants. Second Class Cities Law § 30; Poughkeepsie City Code § 1-2. Questions as to the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the statute are to be left to the Legislature. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). Moreover, courts are bound to construe statutes as they have been drawn and are not to review the expediency, wisdom or propriety of a Legislature's actions if such matters are performed within its powers. Lawrence Construction Corp. v. State of New York, 293 NY 634, 639 (1944).

And while municipalities have broad authority to enact legislation that promotes the welfare of their constituents, the New York State Constitution limits that power to local governments to the extent that they may not adopt laws inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs, or government. NY Const. art. IX, 2(c). Pusatere v. City of Albany, Sup. Ct. Albany Co., June 30, 2022, Ryba, S.C.J. Index No. 909653-21, citing NY Const. art. IX, 2(c); Municipal Home Rule Law 10(1)(i), (ii); Nyack v. Daytop Vill. Inc., 78 NY2d 500, 505 (1991); see also, Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372, 377 (1989).

There is a strong presumption that a legislative statute is constitutional, and its invalidity must be demonstrated by the party opposing it beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333, 337 (1969). Only in rare cases should courts of the first instance — like here — find acts of the Legislature unconstitutional. People v. Zongone, supra citing People v. Mason, 99 Misc 2d 583, 587 (Richmond County 1979). Facial challenges to statutes are generally disfavored because legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Taylor, 9 NY3d 129, 150 (2007). Moreover, the burden of proof in demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional rests with the one who seeks to invalidate it. People v. Bright, 71 NY2d 376, 382 (1988). And, in those instances, courts should declare statutes unconstitutional only as a last unavoidable resort. South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern, 303 NY 545, 555 affirmed 344 U.S. 367 (1953). Matter of Pratt v. Tofany, 37 AD2d 854 (2d Dept. 1971).

The Preemption Doctrine limits municipalities' law-making authority. People v. Torres, 37 NY3d 256, 265 (2021) citing Albany Area Bldrs. Assn., supra. Specifically, "Conflict Preemption" prohibits a local government from adopting any laws inconsistent with state law, while "Field Preemption" prohibits a local government from legislating in a field or area of the law where the "legislature has assumed full regulatory responsibility." People v. Torres, supra; Matter of Highway Super. Assn. of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 150 AD3d 731, 734 (2017).

Here, this Court finds that the GCEL passed by the City of Poughkeepsie is void and unenforceable under the New York State Constitution because the GCEL is inconsistent with duly enacted New York State Laws on eviction proceedings. NY Const., Art. IX, 2; Albany Area Builders Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372, 377 (1989); People v. Torres, 37 NY3d 256, 265 (2021). Under the legal doctrine of Conflict Preemption, the GCEL is preempted by numerous New York State Laws. Pusatere v. City of Albany, Sup. Ct. Albany Co., June 30, 2022, Ryba, S.C.J. Index No. 909653-21.

The City of Poughkeepsie Common Council's GCEL, adopted in 2021, prohibits landlords from evicting tenants except under special circumstances. For example, it prevents landlords from evicting tenants who refuse to pay rent if they consider rent increases to be "unconscionable" — otherwise described as "predatory" rent increases. Moreover, the GCEL imposes a "good cause" requirement to institute a summary eviction proceeding; and it caps rental increases to 5% annually.

Under the legal doctrine of "Conflict Preemption," the GCEL is inconsistent with New York State Real Property Law § 226-c — which authorizes evictions based upon an expired lease or non-renewal lease — in that the GCEL precludes a landlord from evicting a tenant without good cause.

Moreover, the GCEL is inconsistent with New York State Real Property Law § 226-c(1)(a) — which authorizes rental increases of greater than 5% provided the tenant is given appropriate statutory notice — in that the GCEL prohibits a landlord from increasing rent by 5% in any twelve-month period without good cause.

In addition, the GCEL is inconsistent with New York State Real Property Law § 228 — which authorizes a landlord to evict based upon expiration of a tenancy — in that the GCEL requires a landlord to establish good cause to evict someone even if the lease has expired.

As well, the GCEL is inconsistent with New York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 711(1) — which authorizes a landlord to evict a tenant based upon an expired lease — in that the GCEL requires a landlord to establish good cause to evict someone even if the lease has expired.

"Conflict Preemption" — once again — prohibits a local government from adopting a law inconsistent with state law, and here the GCEL is in direct conflict with R.P.L. § 226-c(1)(a) and R.P.L. § 228, as well as R.P.A.P.L. § 711(1), because it strips a landlord's New York State statutorily enacted right to terminate, or otherwise not elect to renew a tenancy, without good cause. Moreover, it prohibits a landlord from increasing rent by more than 5% annually without good cause. Since the City of Poughkeepsie Common Council is prohibited from enacting a law inconsistent with general laws of New York State, the GCEL is void and unenforceable.

Even if this Court found that the GCEL was valid — which it has not — while respondent has the benefit of a strong presumption set forth in the GCEL, that presumption is rebuttable. Here, petitioner set forth sufficient evidence in admissible form to rebut the presumption that would have defeated respondent's motion to dismiss. In addition, even if this Court found the GCEL to be valid and enforceable, issues of fact have been raised in the papers, including market analysis of current rentals in several nearby apartment complexes, that would have defeated the motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding same, this Court would have had to reach an absurd result by not addressing these constitutional issues."